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ike the thousands of New Yorkers confronted with legal 
crises each year, “MC,” a low-income woman, needed 
representation in a divorce proceeding but could not afford 
to retain private counsel.  She contacted a small, nonprofit 
legal organization for help.  As New York’s Chief Justice, Jonathan 
Lippman, and other prominent pro bono advocates have erected a 
robust architecture for pro bono service, it is not surprising that the 
organization placed her case with a private sector lawyer.  The 
attorney who ultimately agreed to represent MC on a pro bono basis 
was an associate at one of the country’s largest and most highly 
regarded law firms. 
The firm handling MC’s case recently received the Litigation 
Department of the Year designation from The American Lawyer 
magazine.  To its prospective, paying clients, this firm promises that 
it “can rapidly assemble a focused, integrated and efficient team to 
address all important aspects of a client’s problem and to handle 
numerous cases in multiple jurisdictions and forums.”1  Yet, no such 
team was assembled to handle MC’s case.  Instead, the firm assigned 
a junior associate to represent her.  By all accounts, that novice 
attorney worked in isolation from her colleagues.  She failed to 
consult with any seasoned litigators or negotiators when 
complications arose in the case.  Moreover, her in-person 
interactions with MC reflected either obliviousness or indifference to 
her client’s concerns as a domestic violence survivor.2 
Not only was MC’s attorney inexperienced, supervision practices 
within the pro bono firm and capacity building efforts within the bar 
inadequately prepared the attorney to zealously represent her client.  
The attorney failed to take many steps that would be considered 
                                                
1 Litigation, SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM LLP, 
http://www.skadden.com/practice/litigation (last visited Nov. 13, 2014). 













routine in any litigation.  She did not discuss legal standards relevant 
to the client’s divorce and custody concerns.  Instead, at the outset of 
their attorney-client relationship, MC’s lawyer abandoned her in an 
office with instructions to fill out a number of documents, 
“describ[ing] what had happened in her marriage and why she was 
seeking a divorce.”3  The attorney conceded that she would not 
conduct any independent legal analysis into the facts MC described 
but “that she would type up the information” and submit the signed 
documents to the court.4  The attorney allowed months to elapse 
without informing MC of material developments in the case.  
Eventually, when settlement negotiations deteriorated, the attorney 
pressured MC to waive certain rights to asset distribution and 
relocation.  Her letter to MC stated, among other things: 
 
Please be advised that I was not retained for a 
contested divorce, nor was I retained to advise you 
regarding relocation.  Rather you originally retained 
me as pro bono counsel . . . I do not have the 
experience or the time to handle a lengthy relocation 
trial.  However, once you obtain the divorce, if you 
do obtain it, you are free to hire whomever you wish, 
maybe even court appointed counsel, to litigate the 
relocation issue.”5 
 
Given her inability to afford alternative counsel, MC acquiesced to 
her husband’s settlement demands, waiving her right to equitable 
distribution and relinquishing her right to relocate with the child 
without his consent or a court order. 
 These facts are drawn from the case, MC v. GC, one of the few 
reported cases that address unethical behavior by elite attorneys who 
perform direct legal service to poor individuals.6  Yet, the lack of 
                                                
3 Id. at 220. 
4 Id.  
5 Id. at 223. 
6 The pro bono attorney representing MC presented her client with an equitable 
distributions waiver, a preprinted form created by the nonprofit referring 
organization, without developing an informed understanding of marital property 
distribution rules or the impact of executing the waiver.  When the client requested 












reported decisions on misconduct by pro bono attorneys representing 
low-income clients is hardly indicative of quality of services 
provided to indigent clients.  On the contrary, one recent survey 
showed that forty-seven percent of public interest law practitioners 
who refer pro bono cases to law firms reported having “moderate” or 
“extensive” problems with the services provided by private 
attorneys.7  Other public interest lawyers relate that with alarming 
frequency, pro bono attorneys appear to be inadequately equipped to 
provide competent representation and lack the cultural awareness to 
effectively serve diverse or challenging clients.8  Behind closed 
doors, many full-time public interest lawyers caution one another 
about pro bono attorneys who have missed critical filing deadlines or 
act with indifference to the needs of indigent litigants.   
 Even conscientious pro bono attorneys who possess the requisite 
skills sometimes forsake their pro bono clients when obligations to 
paying clients escalate.  One nonprofit attorney lamented, “my own 
experience showed me time and time again that institutional 
commitments to pro bono work are often only as strong as the 
amount of non-billable time that exists in the life of the pro bono 
                                                                                                            
her that by waiving that at this point, you know, if she wasn’t interested, if she 
waived her rights that she wouldn’t later be able to seek, go after them.”  MC, 25 
Misc.3d at 221.  The attorney erroneously advised the client that if she voiced her 
desire to move out of state prior to finalizing the divorce, the client would be 
unsuccessful in seeking to relocate out-of-state with her child.  Not only did the 
pro bono attorney fail to conduct the research and preparation required to meet 
Model Rule 1.1’s minimal competence standard, she did not associate or consult 
with an attorney of established competence to protect the client’s interests.  N.Y. 
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 cmt. 3 (2014).  The New York Supreme Court 
concluded, “while the [client] had an attorney of record, she had no meaningful 
representation on financial issues and custody.”  MC, 25 Misc.3d at 228.  The MC 
court did not couch its opinion in terms of Model Rule 1.1, but it unambiguously 
concluded that the attorney in question failed to provide competent representation 
to her client.  Id.  
7 Scott L. Cummings & Rebecca L. Sandefur, Beyond the Numbers: What We 
Know—and Should Know—About American Pro Bono, 7 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 
83, 102 (2013).  
8 Leonore F. Carpenter, “We’re Not Running a Charity Here”: Re-Thinking Public 
Interest Lawyers’ Relationships with Bottom-Line Driven Pro Bono Programs, 29 
BUFF. PUB. INT. L. J. 37, 69–70 (2011); Theodore O. Fillette III, Thoughts on 
Better Practices for Pro Bono Legal Service for Clients of Legal Services 












attorney.”9  Instances of pro bono attorneys seeking to terminate 
representation of pro bono clients due to their work for paying 
clients are all too common. 
While many private sector attorneys offer pro bono legal services 
that reflect the same level of diligence and skill characteristic of the 
work done on behalf of their paying clients, the egregious failures 
described in the MC v. GC case and those that occur in many 
unreported matters highlight the dangers of pro bono initiatives 
designed to bridge the “access to justice gap.”  As used here, the 
term “justice gap” refers to the chasm between the need for legal 
representation in civil disputes and public interest attorneys available 
to serve poor and working class clients.  Justice gap pro bono 
programs connect low-income individuals in need of legal assistance 
in matters such as eviction prevention, family disputes, and 
consumer debt collection cases with attorneys from large law firms 
that typically specialize in commercial litigation and corporate 
transactions. 10   Though well intentioned, justice gap pro bono 
initiatives that succeed do so in spite of the impediments to ethical 
representation that pervade this method of legal service delivery.  
The market forces and “informal collegial control”11 that shape 
attorney conduct in the for-profit setting are often absent within the 
world of pro bono service.  Moreover, the ethics rules that should 
govern pro bono attorneys offer inadequate guidance to lawyers 
grappling with the unique concerns of pro bono lawyering practiced 
in a for-profit context.   
                                                
9 Carpenter, supra note 8, at 64–65.  
10 The term “justice gap” was repeatedly used by Chief Judge Jonathan Lippman 
of the New York Court of Appeals who championed amendments to attorney 
admission rules to require bar applicants to complete at least 50 hours of pro bono 
service as a condition of admission.  See generally Lydia Chan, New York’s New 
Rule: A Novel Approach to Closing the Access to Justice Gap, 26 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 597 (2013).  As used here, “justice gap pro bono” does not encompass 
public interest class actions, law reform litigation, criminal defense, and free 
services provided to nonprofit institutions.   
11 For an overview of how informal collegial control combines with formal 
systems of ethics oversight in different practice settings, see Leslie C. Levin & 
Lynn Mather, Why Context Matters, in LAWYERS IN PRACTICE: ETHICAL 













 It may be tempting to conclude that the Model Rules and their 
state-level corollaries equally inform all attorney-client relationships, 
regardless of whether the client pays for services.  However, that 
theoretically attractive conclusion is at odds with reality.  In fact, 
many attorneys conceptualize pro bono work as a form of legal 
charity, unmoored from the moderating influence of ethics rules and 
practice norms with which they are most familiar.  Furthermore, the 
Model Rules and their state law analogues favor indeterminate, 
highly subjective ethics norms over specific guidance on how rules 
should be applied in day-to-day practice.  This approach may be 
sufficient when the professional identities of attorneys are aligned 
with those of their clients and practice-specific conventions 
supplement formal ethics rules.  However, no robust system of 
ethical guidance governs pro bono lawyers who lack such support.  
When the ethics conventions with which pro bono attorneys are most 
familiar seem inapplicable, the Model Rules framework 
insufficiently instructs pro bono practice.   
 The purpose of this article is not to denigrate pro bono service.  
Each year, countless individuals who would otherwise proceed 
without legal help of any kind benefit from pro bono assistance; 
neither is it my aim to critique the “misaligned incentives” 
underlying legal volunteerism.12  Those topics have been explored 
expertly by a number of experienced practitioners and legal scholars.  
It is also not my intention to malign individual attorneys who accept 
pro bono matters amidst the considerable pressure to serve paying 
clients.  Rather, this article will first discuss the role of justice gap 
pro bono in meeting the civil legal needs of the poor.  It will then 
address the ways in which the justice gap pro bono model of 
expanding civil legal services inadequately self-regulates attorney 
conduct.  After turning attention to specific elements of the ABA’s 
Model Rules that inadequately address contemporary pro bono 
practice, I will suggest possible reasons for the Model Rules’ 
inattention to these issues and propose a few modest 
recommendations for incorporating guidance for pro bono attorneys 
into the existing ethical framework. 
                                                
12 Scott L. Cummings & Deborah L. Rhode, Managing Pro Bono: Doing Well by 












I. UNDERSTANDING PRO BONO SERVICE IN CONTEXT 
A. Pro Bono as a Remedy for Insufficient Civil Legal Resources 
Fewer than twenty percent of the low-income people facing 
eviction, debt collection actions, divorce, and other legal crises 
involving necessities of life have access to legal counsel.”13  In fact, 
more than two million pro se litigants appear each year in New York 
courts alone.14  New York is not the only jurisdiction to experience a 
significant increase in the number of self-represented parties in 
recent years.  In California, for example, approximately seventy-five 
percent of parties in divorce cases appear without attorneys.15  Even 
the federal courts have not escaped the growing “pro se 
phenomenon.”16  Nearly forty percent of all cases filed in federal 
court involve an unrepresented party.17  
State courts of limited jurisdiction that handle housing, family, or 
low dollar figure disputes are intended to be accessible to self-
represented litigants.  However, pro se parties appearing in these 
forums often lack a basic understanding of the substantive claims 
and defenses relevant to their cases.  They frequently struggle to 
satisfy basic procedural requirements to commence litigation or 
pursue discovery.  In my current practice, I encounter many litigants 
whose otherwise meritorious claims were dismissed when set forth 
in pro se petitions due to the client’s inability to effectuate service of 
process or file necessary documents.  Pro se litigants unfamiliar with 
basic court rules and the substantive law governing their dispute 
                                                
13 Tom Lininger, Deregulating Public Interest Law, 88 TUL. L. REV. 727, 730 
(2014); see also LEGAL SERVS. CORP., DOCUMENTING THE JUSTICE GAP IN 
AMERICA: THE CURRENT UNMET CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS OF LOW-INCOME 
AMERICANS 14 (2009), available at 
http://www.lsc.gov/sites/default/files/LSC/pdfs/documenting_the_justice_gap_in_
america_2009.pdf.  
14 Jonathan Lippman, Law in the 21st Century: Enduring Traditions, Emerging 
Challenges, Remarks at Law Day 2010 (May 3, 2010), available at 
http://www.nycourts.gov/whatsnew/pdf/Law%20Day%202010.pdf. 
15 See generally Drew A. Swank, The Pro Se Phenomenon, 19 B.Y.U. J. PUB. L. 
373, 376 (2005). 
16 Id.  












compromise efficiency in these courts where judges already labor 
under heavy dockets.18  
Leaders within the judiciary and other advocates seeking to 
bridge this gap between civil legal needs and available legal services 
have proposed a number of recommendations to expand available 
assistance to poor litigants.  Nationwide, bar associations and 
scholars encourage legal services and low fee attorneys to offer 
“unbundled” or limited scope services to pro se litigants who cannot 
afford to retain counsel for full representation in civil cases.19  
Others advocate for demystification and streamlining of procedures 
for unrepresented parties. 20   However, the dominant 
recommendation to address the unmet need for civil legal assistance 
is to expand pro bono service by private sector attorneys.21  Access 
to justice commissions from Hawaii to New York promote pro bono 
participation as a way to improve poor people’s access to legal 
                                                
18 Judge Benita Pearson, a federal judge in Ohio, fears that without expanding the 
ranks of attorneys who offer full representation to low- and moderate-income 
litigants, the increase in pro se litigation will reduce courts to “a crawl.”  Jack P. 
Sahl, Real Metamorphosis or More of the Same: Navigating the Practice of Law in 
the Wake of Ethics 20/20—Globalization, New Technologies, and What It Means 
to Be a Lawyer in These Uncertain Times, 47 AKRON L. REV. 1, 28 (2014). 
19 See generally Jessica K. Steinberg, In Pursuit of Justice? Case Outcomes and 
the Delivery of Unbundled Legal Services, 18 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 
453 (2011); Justice Fern Fisher-Brundveen & Rochele Klempnor, Unbundled 
Legal Services: Untying the Bundle in New York State, 29 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 
1107 (2002). 
20 Lauren Sudeall Lucas, Deconstructing the Right to Counsel, AM. CONST. 
SOC’Y FOR L. & POL’Y 11 (July 22, 2014), available at 
https://www.acslaw.org/sites/default/files/Lucas_-
_Deconstructing_the_Right_to_Counsel.pdf; Charles R. Dyer et al., Improving 
Access to Justice: Plain Language Family Law Court Forms in Washington State, 
11 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 1065, 1065 (2013). 
21 Lininger, supra note 13, at 736.  In his August 2013 address to the American 
Bar Association, Attorney General Eric Holder urged attendees to “answer the 
ABA’s call to contribute to this cause through pro bono service—and help realize 
the promise of equal justice for all.”  Eric Holder, Remarks at the Annual Meeting 
of the American Bar Association’s House of Delegates (Aug. 12, 2013), available 
at http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/2013/ag-speech-130812.html.  The 
National Center for State Courts offers similarly enthusiastic support for pro bono 
expansion.  See generally Pro Bono and Volunteer Programs, NATIONAL CENTER 
FOR STATE COURTS, http://www.ncsc.org/microsites/access-to-













information and full representation in civil litigation. 22  A number of 
jurisdictions have even proposed rule changes that would allow 
private attorneys not licensed in the state to perform pro bono 
services.23  For example, New York recently expanded pro bono 
opportunities for non-lawyer advocates, law students, and in-house 
counsel not admitted to practice in an effort to bridge this gap.24  The 
state also implemented mandatory pro bono reporting requirements, 
presumably to shame attorneys into increasing their pro bono 
service.25   
B. Evolution of the Pro Bono Market 
  The American approach to providing civil legal assistance to 
low-income litigants who cannot retain counsel can be analogized to 
“a three legged stool, resting on the work of three distinct groups of 
lawyers: i) those funded by the federal Legal Services 
Corporation,” 26  ii) full-time poverty lawyers who practice in 
                                                
22 See Access to Justice Room Attorneys Recognized, HAW. STATE JUD. (Mar. 7, 
2013), 
http://www.courts.state.hi.us/news_and_reports/featured_news/2013/03/pro_bono.
html (last visited Nov. 24, 2014); Task Force to Expand Civil Legal Services in NY, 
N.Y. STATE UNIFIED CT. SYS., https://www.nycourts.gov/ip/access-civil-legal-
services/ (last visited Nov. 24, 2014). 
23 See, e.g., Arkansas Access to Justice Commission Proposes Rule Change at the 
Mid Year Meeting, ARK. LEGAL SERVS. P’SHIP (Jan. 7, 2011), 
http://www.arlegalservices.org/node/573 (last visited Nov. 24, 2014).   
24 See 22 NYCRR § 522.8; see also Fern Fisher, Moving Toward a More Perfect 
World: Achieving Equal Access to Justice Through a New Definition of Judicial 
Activism, 17 CUNY L. REV. 285 (2015); Daniel C.W. Lang, Utilizing Nonlawyer 
Advocates to Bridge the Justice Gap in America, 17 WIDENER L. REV. 289, 300 
(2011); Hon. Jonathan Lippman, The State of the Judiciary 2014: Vision and 
Action in Our Modern Courts (2014), available at 
https://www.nycourts.gov/ctapps/soj2014.pdf.  
25 Chan, supra note 10, at 599–600; see N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. 22, § 
118.1(e)(14) (2013) (requiring that each attorney, as part of his or her biennial 
registration in New York, report (1) the number of hours that the registrant 
voluntarily spent providing legal services free of charge to poor and underserved 
clients, and (2) the amount of voluntary financial contributions the registrant made 
to organizations providing legal services to the poor and underserved during the 
previous biennial registration period).   
26 LSC is a congressionally-funded, grant-making entity created in 1974 “that 
responds to locally initiated proposals for providing civil legal services to the 












nonprofit settings funded by philanthropic entities, private donations, 
and government grants independent of the LSC, and iii) volunteer 
attorneys from the private sector.27  LSC-funded programs provide 
the bulk of legal representation to low-income individuals in civil 
matters.  Annually, LSC distributes nearly $350,000,000 to more 
than 130 legal services organizations across the country.28  The level 
of pro bono participation in those LSC-funded organizations has 
steadily increased in recent years.  Between 2011 and 2012, for 
example, the number of cases closed by pro bono attorneys grew by 
twelve percent.   At current levels, the pro bono hours reported by 
LSC grant recipients amounts to nearly thirty percent of the hours 
served by all of the full-time, staff attorneys employed in LSC-
funded programs.29  Even non-LSC-affiliated nonprofits that receive 
funds from interest on lawyer trust accounts and other forms of 
funding must meticulously document and report every hour of pro 
bono assistance their clients receive by members of the private bar, 
another way to encourage nonprofits to incorporate pro bono 
volunteers into their legal services delivery systems.30   
The dramatic growth of pro bono programs during the 1990s 
occurred partly in response to federal divestment from the LSC 
during that same period.31  Many of the legal nonprofits that today 
refer clients for pro bono help are organizations with a Civil Rights 
era history of pursuing social justice on behalf of low-income 
people.32  One conservative reaction to the law reform and anti-
poverty organizing work once central to the mission of these 
                                                                                                            
Legal Aid, in PRIVATE LAWYERS & THE PUBLIC INTEREST: THE EVOLVING 
ROLE OF PRO BONO IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION 96 (Robert Granfield & Lynn 
Mather eds., 2009).  In 2014, the LSC was responsible for distributing more than 
$400 million in funds to nationwide grantees.  LSC FY 2014 Funding, LEGAL 
SERVS. CORP., http://www.lsc.gov/congress/funding/lsc-fy-2014-funding (last 
visited Nov. 13, 2014). 
27 Sandefur, supra note 26, at 95–96.  
28 LSC 2013 Annual Report, LEGAL SERVS. CORP., 
http://www.lsc.gov/about/2013-annual-report (last visited Apr. 14, 2015). 
29 Sandefur, supra note 26, at 96.  
30 See New York IOLTA Grantee Activity Report.   
31 Cummings & Sandefur, supra note 7.  
32 Corey S. Shadamiah, Legal Services Lawyers: When Conceptions of Lawyering 
and Values Clash, in LAWYERS IN PRACTICE: ETHICAL DECISION MAKING IN 












organizations was the imposition of congressional restrictions on 
legal services funding.  As conservative opposition to LSC’s 
political positions mounted, LSC funding decreased precipitously, 
dropping fifty percent from 1980 to 2009.33  By the late 1990s, LSC 
grantees faced a host of new restrictions on their work with the 
imposition of congressional restrictions on both the nature of the 
cases they could litigate and the types of individuals these 
organizations could serve. 34   Those restrictions also require 
“grantees [to] make a ‘substantial amount’ of funds available for 
[p]rivate [a]ttorney [i]nvolvement,” money principally directed 
towards expanding pro bono volunteer capacity. 35   Nonprofit 
organizations that receive funding from the LSC must allocate 
twelve and a half percent of their federal grants to pro bono “joint 
ventures.”36  The number of formal, pro bono programs increased 
tenfold between 1980 and 1985 and then doubled again between 
1985 and 2004.37  
While congressional control of LSC funding served as one factor 
driving the increase in pro bono activity, changes in the for-profit 
market for legal services exerted a powerful influence on the 
development of these programs.  Elite firms in the major legal 
markets of Chicago, Los Angeles, New York City and Washington 
D.C. expanded significantly from the 1990s until the 2008 
recession.38  These firms increasingly concentrated their practices on 
more high-stakes litigation and specialized transactions on behalf of 
their corporate clients at the expense of assisting in a broad range of 
                                                
33 Scott L. Cummings, The Future of Public Interest Law, 33 U. ARK. LITTLE 
ROCK L. REV. 355, 363 (2011). 
34 See, e.g., Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions & Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. 
L. No. 104–34, § 504(a), 110 Stat. 1321 (1996); see also Scott L. Cummings, The 
Politics of Pro Bono, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1, 22 (2004) [hereinafter Cummings, 
Politics].  With the exception of some emergency assistance and help for certain 
victims of violence, LSC grantees are largely precluded from serving 
undocumented immigrants.  See generally Geoffrey Heeren, Illegal Aid: Legal 
Assistance to Immigrants in the United States, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 619, 674 
(2011). 
35 Cummings, supra note 33, at 362.  
36 45 C.F.R. § 1614.2 (2013). 
37 Cummings, supra note 33, at 362.  
38 See generally Albert Yoon, Competition and the Evolution of Large Law Firms, 












matters of varying size and complexity.39  To staff these matters, 
elite firms recruited a proverbial army of relatively inexperienced 
attorneys that sometimes face periods of low activity on paying 
matters.40  It is this pool of associates that periodically has surplus 
capacity to accept assignments that most frequently staff justice gap 
pro bono initiatives.  Firms employing this staffing structure 
discovered the recruiting and retention potential of pro bono work.  
Over time, major-market firms embraced pro bono participation as a 
way to train novice associates without passing those costs along to 
their corporate clients. 
The confluence of funding imperatives and structural changes in 
major legal markets resulted in elite members of the private bar 
dominating pro bono practice.  In 1984, approximately forty percent 
of all pro bono hours served in organized pro bono programs were 
contributed by attorneys employed at firms of twenty or more 
lawyers.41  Today, urban law firms with more than one hundred 
attorneys provide the largest number of hours of free legal assistance 
to low-income clients and nonprofit organizations, even though large 
firm attorneys constitute less than twenty percent of all lawyers in 
private practice.42  
Justice gap pro bono programs based in elite law firms do more 
than simply link well-heeled attorneys with low-income individuals 
facing legal crises.  At a macro level, they seek to remedy three 
related problems in the legal services market: the inability of law 
                                                
39 These practice-area changes shifted firms away from both their holistic 
counseling role, one that occasionally required generalist, “full service” practices, 
towards an increasingly specialized form of practice that leaves fewer 
opportunities to develop the skills commonly used by attorneys who represent 
individual clients.  See David Wilkins, Some Realism about Legal Realism, in 
LAWYERS IN PRACTICE: ETHICAL DECISION MAKING IN CONTEXT, supra note 
11, at 27–30. 
40 Jack W. Londen, The Impact of Pro Bono Work on Law Firm Economics, 9 GEO. 
J. LEGAL ETHICS 925, 925 (1996) (“A law firm employs the right-sized staff to 
handle all the billable work that it expects to attract, plus the other tasks including 
business development, firm administration and pro bono work.  The firm also 
usually has some additional capacity before hitting the limit on hours that the 
firm’s lawyers are willing to work”); see also Richard Abel, The Paradoxes of Pro 
Bono, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2443, 2448 (2010). 
41 Sandefur, supra note 26, at 100.  
42 ABA STANDING COMM. ON PRO BONO & PUB. SERVS., SUPPORTING JUSTICE 












firms to properly train new associates at their clients’ expense; the 
dissatisfaction of many young associates that leads to high rates of 
turnover; and the paucity of attorneys willing to handle matters for 
which little profit can be generated.43  Given these objectives and the 
direct benefits that accrue to for-profit firms as a result of their 
participation in pro bono initiatives, it has become increasingly 
difficult to argue that justice gap lawyering is truly service provided 
in pro bono publico.  Unlike the typical case in which the client is 
the primary beneficiary of legal services and the firm is rewarded 
with fees, the intended beneficiary of justice gap pro bono service 
are entities other than the client: the pro bono attorney whose skills 
are enhanced on a case that poses little or no financial risk to the 
firm; the firms that benefit from the improved recruitment and 
retention; and the corporate clients that receive higher quality legal 
services without incurring training costs.44  Increasingly popular 
“pro bono joint ventures” between law firms and their corporate 
clients aim to serve law firms’ business development goals.45  While 
participants in these programs seek to “do good” by offering legal 
services, the objective of these programs is not simply to improve 
the efficient delivery of services to clients in crisis or expand the 
scope of high-quality services offered to indigent persons.  Rather, 
their overarching objective is to forge more productive working 
relationships between in-house counsel offices and outside law firms 
for business development purposes.46 
                                                
43 Drew A. Swank, The Pro Se Phenomenon, 19 BYU J. PUB. L. 373, 380 (2005). 
44 Roy S. Ginsburg, Makes Cents: The Business Case for Pro Bono, 62 BENCH & 
B. MINN. 1, 2 (2005), available at 
http://www.royginsburg.com/files/cle_article_3.pdf (“For attorneys in private 
practice, pro bono service can be strategically used for client development.”); 
Reena N. Glazer, Revisiting the Business Case for Law Firm Pro Bono, 51 S. TEX. 
L. REV. 563, 586 (2010) (“[I]n troubled times, the role of pro bono in enhancing 
morale and creating a sense of calm, teamwork, and mutual respect and support is 
unparalleled.”). 
45 Glazer, supra note 44, at 573. 
46 Ginsburg explained, “One never hears about lawyers turning away paying work 
because they were too busy doing pro bono service.  Nevertheless, many find the 
time to make sure pro bono service is one of the things that ‘get done.’  
Furthermore, it’s worth questioning the assumption that attorneys who perform pro 
bono work make significant financial sacrifices.  Last year, the American Lawyer 
magazine ranked the pro bono efforts of the nations’ major law firms based on the 












II. MODEL RULE 6.1 AND THE EVOLUTION OF LEGAL CHARITY 
A. Voluntary Legal Service Before Model Rule 6.1 
 When the ABA’s House of Delegates passed a resolution in 
August 1975, “confirming the basic responsibility of each lawyer 
engaged in the practice of law to provide public interest legal 
services without fee, or at a substantially reduced fee, in . . . poverty 
law, civil rights law, public rights law, charitable organization 
representation, and administration of justice,” 47  it did not 
differentiate between the elite law firms that would come to 
dominate the pro bono landscape and other practitioners in small and 
solo practices; nor did it distinguish between novice and experienced 
attorneys.  All attorneys share the obligation to offer legal assistance 
for the public good.  Thirteen years later, that resolution was 
formalized in Rule 6.1 of the Model Rules, which the overwhelming 
majority of States have adopted with some variations.48  Under 
Model Rule 6.1, attorneys should dedicate fifty hours each year to 
pro bono work.  Qualifying activities include providing legal advice 
or representation for free or at significantly reduced rates to “persons 
of limited means” and organizations that provide services to such 
individuals.49   
 The ABA’s 1975 resolution and subsequent rule change reflected 
a significant departure from historical conceptions of pro bono 
lawyering.  Throughout most of America’s legal history, attorneys 
dispensed “ad hoc and individualized” assistance as a form of 
                                                                                                            
more than 20 hours of pro bono service per year.  Of the ten firms ranked highest, 
all had very healthy profits per partner, most between $500,000 and $1 million or 
more.”  Ginsburg, supra note 44, at 2.  
47 JAYNE B. TYRRELL, THE LAW FIRM PRO BONO MANUAL 2 (1989).  
48 Id.  For a description of how Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, and 
Washington have approached Rule 6.1, see Quintin Johnstone, Law and Policy 
Issues Concerning the Provision of Adequate Legal Services for the Poor, 20 
CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 571, 609 (2011). 
49 It is important to note that Rule 6.1 does not, in fact, obligate attorneys to 
provide free legal help for the poor.  Rather, lawyers may satisfy Rule 6.1 by 
participating in “legislative lobbying, administrative rule making and the provision 
of free training or mentoring to those who represent persons of limited means” as 
well as “activities that improve the law, the legal system or the legal profession.”  












“professional charity.”50   Traditionally, individual attorneys who 
provided “pro bono service” performed work within their regular 
area of practice and simply forgave legal bills that a client was 
unable to pay.  As Judith Maute described in her discussion of pro 
bono regulation, nineteenth century conceptions of attorney 
professional conduct reflected a “reactive” approach to practice and 
suggested that attorneys should not turn away poor clients who 
solicited legal advice.51  The Code of Ethics adopted by the Alabama 
State Bar in 1887 recommended that lawyers make downward fee 
adjustments and waive fees for certain poor clients but “[s]tate[d] no 
expectation that all lawyers would engage in some work for the 
public good.” 52   Indeed, Canon 12 of the ABA’s Cannons of 
Professional Ethics, adopted in 1908, simply advised that an 
individual’s “poverty” or status as a widow or orphan could justify 
the extension of special professional considerations such as free 
legal assistance.53  The ABA’s Code of Professional Responsibility, 
precursor to the Model Rules, similarly explained that “[t]he basic 
responsibility for providing legal services for those unable to pay 
ultimately rests upon the individual lawyer, and personal 
involvement in the problems of the disadvantaged can be one of the 
most rewarding experiences in the life of the lawyer.”54   
 Before the modern pro bono era, litigators interested in a 
particular cause frequently offered free representation to an 
individual defendant or social activist who was unable to pay for 
services due to the compelling nature of the matter at issue.  The 
example of one of New York’s most esteemed law firms, Cravath, 
Swaine & Moore LLP, illustrates this historical pro bono model.  In 
1803, one of Cravath’s founding partners “defended the first Native 
American tried for the murder of a white man in the State of New 
York” and another “represented a recently released ex-convict 
                                                
50 Cummings, Politics, supra note 34, at 6.  
51 Judith Maute, Changing Conceptions of Lawyers’ Pro Bono Responsibilities 
from Chance Noblesse Oblige to Stated Expectations, 77 TUL. L. REV. 91, 98–100 
(2002). 
52 Id. at 109.  
53 David J. Dreyer, Culture, Structure, and Pro Bono Practice, 33 J. LEGAL PROF. 
185, 193–94 (2009).  For a more detailed discussion of the Canons of Professional 
Ethics, see Susan D. Carle, Lawyers’ Duty to Do Justice: A New Look at the 
History of the 1908 Canons, 24 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1 (1999). 












accused of stealing six cents worth of fabric.”55  In the 1820s, the 
firm accepted two other pro bono matters that helped to establish the 
insanity defense in criminal proceedings. 56   Later, during the 
Progressive Era, social justice and law reform organizations like the 
NAACP and the National Consumer League routinely “relied on 
outside lawyers, recruited from the upper echelons of the bar” to 
handle test cases on a pro bono basis.57   
 These and countless other examples of nineteenth and early 
twentieth century pro bono activity reveal a conception of pro bono 
service “as an unanticipated extension of professional courtesy 
toward community members who could not afford” counsel or 
something akin to a “quasi-religious obligation to assist the poor.”58  
The pro bono attorneys chose to represent nonpaying clients, and 
forego billing on other matters, because of the attorneys’ personal 
investments in matters, not as a formal ethical imperative.  Of 
particular note, history’s pro bono attorneys, like Cravath’s founding 
partners and Progressive Era advocates, were already experienced 
practitioners when they represented clients on a pro bono basis.  
Their uncompensated representation of impecunious individuals was 
never intended to fill gaps in their substantive knowledge of the law; 
nor did those attorneys anticipate that their pro bono case handling 
could correct deficiencies in the legal market as a whole. 
B. Pro Bono and Business Development  
Justice gap pro bono initiatives at elite law firms complicate the 
concept of pro bono service by divorcing pro bono legal assistance 
from the notion of financial sacrifice for the public good.  Attorneys 
like the Cravath partners and Progressive Era advocates referenced 
above offered pro bono services at the expense of their for-profit 
practice.  Such is a reasonable price for the profession’s monopoly 
on the ability to provide legal services. 59   Today’s pro bono 
initiatives, on the other hand, are designed to increase firm 
                                                
55 Philosophy: A Proud History, CRAVATH, SWAINE & MOORE LLP, 
http://www.cravath.com/proudhistory/ (last visited Nov. 13, 2014). 
56 Id.  
57 Susan Carle, Re-Envisioning Models for Pro Bono Lawyering: Some Historical 
Reflections, 9 AM. U. J. GEND. SOC. POL’Y & L. 81, 93 (2001). 
58 Carpenter, supra note 8, at 46.  












profitability, not displace work on paying matters.  The highly 
leveraged structure of large, major market law firms has not only 
allowed these firms to successfully exploit inequalities in the legal 
system to generate high profits, it facilitates legal “volunteerism” by 
associates who periodically experience reduced workloads on paying 
matters.60  In contrast, small firm and solo practitioners, attorneys 
who may have more experience working with individual clients than 
their large firm counterparts, typically lack the excess staffing and 
related profit margins that support large firm pro bono 
involvement.61  Furthermore, associates at large firms provide direct 
services to indigent clients while receiving a salary not reduced by 
their hours spent in pro bono service.62  Accordingly, the current 
firm-focused pro bono model disproportionately benefits the highest 
earners within the legal market who, by taking advantage of the 
pyramid-like structure of law firms that can afford to “donate” 
time. 63   While the transformation of pro bono service as an 
                                                
60 Referencing principles of game theory, Tom Spahn concluded that pro bono 
service can “improv[e] the firm’s tendency toward creating innovative solutions to 
complex problems in its billable work” by “allowing the firm to explore the legal 
strategic landscape-learning new skills, experimenting with new research tools, 
and sharing abilities across various attorney groups.”  Tom Spahn, Law Firms 
Competing on the “Edge of Chaos”: Pro Bono’s Role in a Winning Competitive 
Strategy, 35 U. HAW. L. REV. 345, 382 (2013); see also Londen, supra note 40, at 
925 (concluding that large firms employ sufficient associates “to handle all the 
billable work that it expects to attract, plus the other tasks including business 
development, firm administration and pro bono work.  The firm also usually has 
some additional capacity before hitting the limit on hours that the firm’s lawyers 
are willing to work.”); John R. Maley, Pro Bono in Law Firms, in BUILDING A 
PRO BONO PRACTICE GROUP: LEADING LAWYERS ON SERVING THE 
COMMUNITY’S LEGAL NEEDS, Astapore, 2013 WL 2728923, at *6 (2013) 
(“Theoretically, lost billable revenue would be a cost of pro bono work, but in 
practice we have not experienced that; pro bono work tends to come from other 
non-billable lawyer time (social, leisure, etc[.]).”); DEBORAH L. RHODE, PRO 
BONO IN PRINCIPLE AND IN PRACTICE 177 (2005). 
61 Londen, supra note 40, at 925 (“For smaller firms, the unavailability of 
particular lawyers is likely to cost the firm billable matters.”). 
62 Sandefur, supra note 26, at 101–02.  
63 It should come as no surprise that the revolt against New York State’s 
mandatory pro bono reporting requirements is being led by attorneys from smaller 
firms located outside of New York City.  See Joel Stashenko, State Bar to Hire 
Counsel Over New Pro Bono Rule, N.Y. L. J., Feb. 3, 2014 (“a former state bar 












affirmative duty may have increased the number of attorneys serving 
poor clients, situating free legal services within this business 
paradigm creates tensions not remedied in the Model Rules or other 
sources of generally applicable professional guidance. 
Shortly after the ABA adopted Rule 6.1 on pro bono service, it 
published a manual for law firms, particularly large firms, to 
promote the creation of formal pro bono programs.  Therein, the 
ABA advised firms that pro bono programs confer numerous 
benefits upon large firms and their associates.  It argued that 
representation of poor clients can “develop valuable legal skills” in 
inexperienced lawyers, “improve[] associate morale,” and “diminish 
associate turnover.”64  The ABA’s guide recommended that law 
firms establish pro bono committees and appoint pro bono 
coordinators to serve as intermediaries between referring legal 
services organizations and firm associates.65  Firms generally applied 
these principles when developing their pro bono infrastructure.66  
Notably, though, the ABA’s early blueprint for large firm pro bono 
practices remained silent about steps firms should take to guarantee 
that pro bono clients receive high quality representation or address 
ethical concerns inherent in these programs.  Aside from its 
admonition that junior associates be appropriately supervised, the 
ABA offered no input on how to ensure pro bono attorney 
competence or sensitize associates to the needs of low-income 
individuals from diverse communities.67   
While the ABA’s Standing Committee on Public Service 
continues to play a leading role in pro bono institutionalization, the 
Washington, DC-based nonprofit, Pro Bono Institute (“PBI”), has 
assumed a leadership role in establishing standards for pro bono 
projects in large law firms and corporate counsel offices across the 
country.68  Through its periodic training and annual events, PBI 
                                                                                                            
impose a burden on solo and small firm practitioners which made up two-thirds of 
the state’s legal profession.”). 
64 TYRRELL, supra note 47, at 3.  
65 Id. at 8.  
66 Cummings, Politics, supra note 34, at 5. 
67 TYRRELL, supra note 47, at 4.  
68 PBI is a member organization organized around several projects, all of which 
provide technical assistance to law firms and/or corporate legal departments 
interested in handling pro bono cases.  Esther Lardent, PBI’s president, has had a 












educates law firms on how to establish economically feasible pro 
bono initiatives.  PBI’s training materials advise law firms on how to 
structure their in-house pro bono committees, establish pro bono 
ventures with corporate clients and control the costs of pro bono 
engagements.69  PBI also instructs law firms and corporate counsel 
departments to conceptualize pro bono opportunities as tools for 
companies to improve associate retention, boost morale and 
“stimulate and satisfy experienced and knowledgeable staff.”70  PBI 
has noted a growing trend toward the development of joint pro bono 
ventures between and among legal departments and their outside 
counsel that “enable[] outside counsel to gain a better understanding 
of the client legal department so they can better respond to its 
commercial needs.” 71   Absent from their offerings are training 
materials on how firms can effectively monitor the outcomes of pro 
bono representation or assess associates’ ability to communicate 
effectively with diverse clients.   
Notably, PBI’s publications do not stress adherence to any set of 
ethics rules for the purpose of protecting pro bono clients.  Rather, 
the scant ethical guidance it provides to firms focus primarily on 
limiting firms’ liability exposure in connection with pro bono 
matters.72  For example, PBI’s Pro Bono Ethics Handbook contains a 
chapter on associate supervision.  It admonishes that firm attorneys 
handling pro bono matters “are often inexperienced and unable to 
provide competent representation,” but offers no technical support or 
practical recommendations for overcoming these deficiencies. 73  
                                                                                                            
Career of Esther Lardent, LAWCROSSING, 
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69 See generally Law Firm Pro Bono Project Resource Clearinghouse, PRO BONO 
INSTITUTE, http://www.probonoinst.org/clearinghouse (last visited Nov. 24, 2014). 
70 Esther F. Lardent, The Business Case for In-House Pro Bono (2012), available 
at http://www.cpbo.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/The-Business-Case-for-In-
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71 Id.  
72 See generally Ethical Issues, PRO BONO INSTITUTE, 
http://www.probonoinst.org/clearinghouse/category/ethical-issues/ (last visited 
Nov. 13, 2014). 
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After noting differences in vicarious liability standards across 
jurisdictions, PBI simply advises supervisors to provide “reasonably 
competent” supervision and “actively ensure” their subordinates’ 
ethical compliance. 74   This recommendation does not establish 
sufficiently clear practice norms for the community of pro bono 
attorneys. 
C. Existing Standards for Poverty Lawyers not Incorporated into 
Pro Bono Mandate 
 As a general matter, the Model Rules avoid matters of cultural 
competence and client-centered lawyering.  It is surprising, then, to 
note that the ABA has adopted detailed technical guidance for 
attorneys who represent low-income clients, including persons with 
diverse linguistic and cultural attributes.  Over the years, it 
promulgated standards and repeatedly revised guidelines for 
nonprofit entities that provide civil legal assistance and operators of 
pro bono programs, the first and second legs of the “three legged 
stool” of civil legal service delivery for poor individuals.  These 
exacting principles that the ABA addresses to full-time poverty 
lawyers outline best practices when profit is not an issue. 
 In 1961, more than a decade before passing the first resolution on 
voluntary pro bono service, the ABA adopted its first set of 
standards for the operation of civil legal aid programs for the poor, 
such as those funded by the LSC.75  With input from the National 
Legal Aid and Defender Association and other attorneys engaged in 
full-time nonprofit work, the Civil Legal Aid Standards set forth 
objective, client-centered guidelines for the provision of culturally 
competent representation.  “[R]esponsiveness to the needs of low-
income communities and of clients who are served,” “achieving 
results,” and treating persons with dignity and respect are core 
objectives outlined in the Civil Legal Aid Standards, along with the 
goals of facilitating “access to justice,” providing “high quality and 
effective assistance,” and ensuring “zealous representation of client 
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interests.”76  The Civil Legal Aid Standards also require nonprofit 
attorneys to offer “culturally competent” representation, defined as 
“the capacity to provide effective legal assistance that is grounded in 
an awareness of and sensitivity to the diverse cultures in the 
provider’s service area . . . having the capacity to interact effectively 
and to understand how the cultural mores and the circumstances of 
the persons from diverse communities affect their interaction with 
the provider and its practitioners and govern their reaction to their 
legal problems and to the process for resolving them.”77  Attorneys 
covered by the Civil Legal Aid Standards must understand and 
respond to the diversity of their clients and target communities to 
provide effective representation.  Beyond that, organizations 
providing civil legal assistance to indigent litigants are supposed to 
reflect the diversity of their client population.78  The goal of these 
staff diversity efforts is to create a legal team that is “well-qualified 
and competent, sensitive to low-income persons and their legal needs, 
and committed to providing high quality legal services.”79   
 These objectives are consistent with much of the legal 
scholarship on cultural competence that explores how ethnic, 
linguistic, and socioeconomic differences among individuals and 
between attorneys and their clients may impact the provision of legal 
services.80  The Civil Legal Aid Standards rightly recognize that 
attorneys who lack cultural competence have difficulty forming 
relationships of trust and communicating effectively with their 
clients.  The Civil Legal Aid Standards also note that a provider’s 
insensitivity to client cultural values of clients might discourage 
others from within the client’s community from seeking legal 
assistance.81 
                                                
76 ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON LEGAL AID AND INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, 
STANDARDS FOR THE PROVISION OF CIVIL LEGAL AID, iii–iv (2006) [hereinafter 
CIVIL LEGAL AID STANDARDS], available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_aid_indigent_d
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77 Id. at 56–57. 
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(2006).  
79 Id. at STANDARD 6.1.  
80 Susan Bryant, The Five Habits: Building Cross-Cultural Competence in 
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 In addition to the Civil Legal Aid Standards, the ABA introduced 
guidelines for pro bono program administrators at nonprofit 
organizations.  The Pro Bono Standards, adopted in February 1996 
and revised most recently in 2013, offer much of the same guidance 
regarding attorney competence and client-centered representation set 
forth in the Civil Legal Aid Standards.  In contrast to the highly 
subjective standard of competence stated in Model Rule 1.1, the Pro 
Bono Standards also establish objective and precise measures of case 
handling success.  They require practitioners to “strive to achieve 
meaningful and lasting results responsive to clients’ needs and 
objectives,” including the goals of “client self-sufficiency and 
empowerment” and law reform on behalf of disadvantaged 
persons. 82   These standards also mandate that pro bono 
administrators at nonprofit organizations ensure their attorney 
volunteers’ cultural competence and sensitivity to clients. 83   In 
August 2013, the ABA’s House of Delegates revised its Standards 
for Programs Providing Civil Pro Bono Legal Services to Persons of 
Limited Means to address the lack of guidance regarding “formal pro 
bono programs” without revising its existing approach to articulating 
practice standards. 
 Nevertheless, the Pro Bono Standards were not intended to revise 
Model Rule 6.1.  They establish guidelines for nonprofit 
administrators, legal services attorneys, and board members of 
organizations responsible for referring low-income individual to pro 
bono attorneys.  Conspicuously absent from this list are the private 
sector law firms and associates retained to represent pro bono clients.  
In fact, the drafters confirmed that the Pro Bono Standards were “not 
intended to create any mandatory requirements or minimum 
standards for performance.”84  These guidelines only address the 
nonprofit organizations that establish formal pro bono service 
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programs, not law firm attorneys who occasionally handle referred 
matters on a pro bono basis.85 
III. SELF-REGULATION FAILURES IN THE PRO BONO MARKET 
A. Competence Defined by the Bottom Line 
In most cases, “the economics of practice and workplace controls 
explain a good deal of the ethical behavior” and professional conduct 
norms that attorneys apply to their work.86  Pro bono proponents 
assume that large firms apply the same ingenuity and tenacity 
extended in support of corporate advocacy to the cases they handle 
for indigent persons.  In so doing, they ignore the many practical 
restraints that consign justice gap representations to a lower standard 
of professional conduct.   
Firms attract paying clients by promising to provide high quality 
performance and positive outcomes.  Major law firms highlight their 
ability to coordinate interdisciplinary teams, quickly conduct legal 
research on novel, complex issues, and provide reliable advice to 
clients. 87   For example, the prominent law firm, Jones Day, 
                                                
85 Id. at 8. 
86 Shadamiah, supra note 32, at 368.  
87 On its website, for example, Cravath notes that it is “frequently retained by 
defendants confronted with major new lawsuits or stunned by massive judgments” 
and that its litigators represent clients “before administrative agencies and 
regulatory authorities and in virtually every other type of proceeding.”  Litigation, 
CRAVATH, SWAINE, & MOORE LLP, http://www.cravath.com/practices/litigation/ 
(last visited Nov. 24, 2014).  Sullivan & Cromwell LLP states that its lawyers 
form seamlessly integrated teams across relevant practices areas and are prepared 
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http://www.hoganlovells.com/aboutus/overview/ (last visited Nov. 24, 2014).  
Morrison & Foerster boasts that “[c]reative thinking, and a passion for practical 
solutions, inform all [the firm’s] work.”  Practices, MORRISON & FOERSTER, 












explained, “[o]ver the long term, the quality of client service offered 
by a firm determines its growth and success.”88  While this may be 
true in the case of corporate clients that have a multitude of legal 
service providers from which to choose, indigent clients and 
nonprofit referral agencies have no way to directly impact a firm’s 
profitability, the primary mechanism for imbuing Model Rule 1.1 
with real meaning and client-directed safeguards.89   
At the institutional level, law firms have no economic incentive 
for regulating the quality of the pro bono service that their attorneys 
provide to indigent clients.  Pro bono matters do not determine law 
firms’ staffing needs, and profits-per-partner are not contingent upon 
outcomes in pro bono matters.90  When LSC reports and law firm 
rankings published by The American Lawyer magazine assign a 
market value to law firm pro bono work, these estimates merely 
reflect the hourly rate normally charged by the law firm for the 
attorneys who worked on the matter.  They are not correlated to the 
outcomes obtained for pro bono clients.91  Low-income persons who 
cannot afford to retain lawyers during a legal crisis are incapable of 
screening prospective counsel and exceedingly unlikely to retain 
counsel to pursue malpractice claims against their pro bono 
attorneys.  Cash-strapped legal services organizations that are 
dependent upon law firms for the provision of in-kind support and 
financial contributions are poorly positioned to offer negative 
                                                
88 Why Do These Differences Produce Better Client Service?, JONES DAY, 
http://www.jonesday.com/principlesandvalues/clientservices/ (last visited Nov. 24, 
2014). 
89 Legal market observers estimate “that a typical corporation is working with 47 
law firms at any given point, and even an average middle-market company is 
working with eight.”  Marlisse Silver Sweeney, 47: That’s How Many Law Firms 
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90 Londen, supra note 40, at 925 (“A law firm employs the right-sized staff to 
handle all the billable work that it expects to attract, plus the other tasks including 
business development, firm administration and pro bono work.  The firm also 
usually has some additional capacity before hitting the limit on hours that the 
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feedback about their referred clients’ experiences. 92   In fact, 
nonprofit organizations possess very little information about the 
track record of the law firms to which they refer clients or the 
training of individual attorneys assigned to the matter.93  Moreover, 
it is hard to imagine that institutional clients decide whether to retain 
a particular firm on a billable matter based on unpublicized 
outcomes achieved in justice gap pro bono cases.94 
Moreover, the few reported cases that discuss attorney 
misconduct in the pro bono context suggest that even egregious 
ethical misconduct in the pro bono context will not result in court-
imposed sanctions.  In MC v. GC, for example, the New York 
Supreme Court concluded that the attorney failed to effectively 
communicate basic legal concepts, subjected the client to duress, and 
                                                
92 See generally Catherine R. Albiston & Laura Beth Nielsen, Funding the Cause: 
How Public Interest Law Organizations Fund Their Activities and Why It Matters 
for Social Change, 39 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 62 (2014).  
93 In my work at a nonprofit law firm, I have noted that public interest attorneys 
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94 Furthermore, pro bono assignments involve one-time engagements with clients.  
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Cummings & Sandefur, supra note 7, at 101.  Most follow the example of PBI’s 
pro bono assessment guide, which simply takes an inventory of “pro bono efforts” 
and policies, not outcomes or client satisfaction.  Law Firm Pro Bono Self-












provided testimony that the court found to be “not reliable.”95  Yet, 
remarkably, the court did not order the law firm to pay sanctions for 
attorney misconduct.  Beyond that, the judge shielded the individual 
attorney from professional embarrassment by excluding her name 
from the opinion.96   
Another case, Maples v. Thomas, offers a chilling example of 
how attorneys who mishandle even the most grave and consequential 
pro bono matters may do so with impunity.  In Maples, the Supreme 
Court grappled with the question of whether a death row inmate who 
had been abandoned by the attorneys who agreed to represent him on 
a pro bono basis would be denied an opportunity to file a writ of 
habeas corpus.97  Two associates from the law firm of Sullivan & 
Cromwell LLP agreed to represent Mr. Maples in connection with 
his post-conviction appeal. 98   These attorneys filed the client’s 
petition for relief, arguing that the client had been denied effective 
assistance of counsel at both the guilt and penalty phases of his 
trial.99  Thereafter, the attorneys left the firm without communicating 
the news of their departure to their client.100  The attorneys also 
failed to seek the Alabama court’s permission to withdraw from the 
representation.101  After the attorneys left the firm, the Alabama trial 
court mailed copies of the order denying the client’s petition to his 
attorneys at the law firm.  Because the attorneys were no longer 
employed by the firm, the documents “were not forwarded to 
another Sullivan & Cromwell attorney.  Instead, a mailroom 
employee sent the unopened envelopes back to the court.”102  Shortly 
thereafter, the client’s time to file a notice of appeal of that decision 
expired, leaving him with no other options to challenge his death 
sentence.103  The Supreme Court’s decision contains nothing to 
suggest that the law firm was required to pay any sanctions for its 
failures.  
                                                
95 MC v. GC, 25 Misc.3d 217, 219 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2009). 
96 Id. at 218 n.2. 
97 Maples v. Thomas, 132 S.Ct. 912, 914 (2012). 
98 Id. 
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B. Developmental Pro Bono as a Remedy for Attorney 
Incompetence 
The Model Rules’ approach to defining attorney competence 
makes enforcement of this ethical norm particularly difficult in the 
pro bono context.  Rule 1.1’s drafters premised their explanatory 
comments on the belief that attorneys will both possess and be 
willing to employ generalist legal skills on behalf of clients, ideas 
inconsistent with current practice trends.  The comment explains: 
 
A lawyer need not necessarily have special training or 
prior experience to handle legal problems of a type 
with which the lawyer is unfamiliar.  A newly 
admitted lawyer can be as competent as a practitioner 
with long experience.  Some important legal skills, 
such as the analysis of precedent, the evaluation of 
evidence and legal drafting are required in all legal 
problems. 104 
 
Yet, these are the practical skills that new attorneys assigned to pro 
bono matters as a matter of professional development are unlikely to 
possess.105   
One recent New York case offers a rare glimpse into the degree 
of preparation that new attorneys at elite law firms, the practitioners 
most likely to handle “justice gap” pro bono cases, require to 
competently handle relatively straightforward matters.  The law firm 
of Mayer Brown LLP assigned a junior litigation associate to a pro 
bono matter106 involving a landlord’s refusal to return a $6,400 
                                                
104 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 cmt. 2 (2012). 
105 Ann Marie Cavazos, Next Phase Pedagogy Reform for the Twenty-First 
Century Legal Education: Delivering Competent Lawyers for a Consumer-Driven 
Market, 45 CONN. L. REV. 1113, 1116 (concluding “[t]oday, law schools are 
ineffective in their preparation of law students who are ineffectual in their ability 
to be able to ‘hit the ground running’ to practice law”). 
106 See Thomas Clozel and Chine Labbe v. Hasan Jalasi and Azra Jalisi, No. 
11227/12, at 2 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County Jan. 14, 2014), available at 
http://nylawyer.nylj.com/adgifs/decisions14/011614nervo.pdf.  Although the client 
does not appear to have been referred as part of a justice gap pro bono initiative, 












security deposit.107  The court rejected Mayer Brown’s claim for 
attorney’s fees authorized under the relevant statute because it 
believed the associate’s billing for researching “procedural rules,” 
analyzing “pleading requirements,” and “becoming familiar with 
basic court procedures that an attorney is presumed to know” was 
inappropriate.108  The court explained: 
 
To demand compensation for two hours of professional 
or non-professional time over three days to accomplish 
this essentially ministerial task, asserting it required 
researching, drafting, conversing, conferring and 
discussing of some sort, the court finds unbelievable.109 
 
It is not the associate’s billing but rather, the judge’s misconception 
about new attorney skills that appears incredible.  This judge, like 
the framers of Model Rule 1.1, presumed that an attorney admitted 
to practice will possess basic knowledge that is neither stressed in 
the law school curriculum nor required as a condition of admission 
to the bar.  In contrast, the ABA’s Code of Professional 
Responsibility, predecessor to the Model Rules, clearly distinguished 
between standards required for admission to practice and attorney 
competence.110  Yet without violating Model Rule 1.1, pro bono 
initiatives place urgent legal matters in the hands of newly admitted 
law firm associates with few of these generalist skills. 
The term “developmental pro bono” refers to the practice of 
strategically assigning law firm associates to perform free legal work 
as a way of advancing the attorneys’ skills and facilitating 
performance evaluations by more senior members of the law firm.111  
The pro bono attorney in that case continues to receive a salary and 
sharpens his or her skills without having to answer to a paying client 
for any missteps or erroneous judgments made over the course of the 
                                                
107 Id. at 1. 
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111 Talent Management Trends: Law Firm Core Competencies and Pro Bono, PRO 
BONO INSTITUTE (2011), available at 
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representation.  Any benefit conferred upon the client as part of this 
capacity-building effort is almost incidental. 
In many instances, firms use justice gap pro bono projects as a 
way to develop young associates’ generalist skills.  This 
“developmental pro bono” model arguably advances access to justice 
objectives if firms limit these assignments to associates who receive 
sufficient supervision.  That is, firms that strategically accept pro 
bono matters for associate development purposes should only do so 
when more experienced practitioners are actively engaged in the 
representation to ensure the more junior attorney’s compliance with 
his or her ethical duty to provide competent and diligent 
representation.  However, firms do not consistently deploy 
developmental pro bono initiatives in this manner.  Developmental 
pro bono work often functions to enhance skills among firms’ least 
experienced attorneys who lack adequate supervision.112   
                                                
112 Law school graduates who immediately join large firms after graduation and 
receive pro bono assignments upon arrival are not required to demonstrate 
practical expertise in any area to gain admission to the bar.  See Robert Rubinson, 
Professional Identity as Advocacy, 31 MISS. C. L. REV. 7, 14–15 (2012) 
(contrasting the bar exam’s emphasis on assessing applicant’s “superficial 
familiarity” with the “classic roster of first year classes” with “board certifications 
in medicine” that require prospective doctors to demonstrate expertise in various 
areas).  Some legal education reformers have concluded that “[e]ven by the end of 
the third year of law school, most law students do not have a realistic 
understanding of what most lawyers do.”  Brent E. Newton, The Ninety-Five 
Theses: Systemic Reforms of American Legal Education and Licensure, 64 S.C. L. 
REV. 55, 81 (2012).  In better economic times for the legal industry, institutional 
clients remained loyal to their law firm advisors, and firms easily passed along the 
costs of training novice associates to their clients without fear of being supplanted 
by a more efficient competitor.  Patrick J. Schiltz explained, “[i]n the days of loyal 
clients and lackadaisical monitoring of legal expenses, time that a senior lawyer 
spent serving as a mentor, and time that a junior lawyer spent being mentored, 
could be charged to a client.” Legal Ethics in Decline: The Elite Law Firm, the 
Elite Law School, and the Moral Formation of the Novice Attorney, 82 MINN. L. 
REV. 705, 743 (1998).  A recent New York Times article noted that prior to the 
Great Recession and resulting contraction in legal markets, “clients have 
essentially underwritten the training of new lawyers, paying as much as $300 an 
hour for the time of associates learning on the job.”  David Segal, What They 
Don’t Teach in Law School: Lawyering, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2011, at A1, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/20/business/after-law-school-
associates-learn-to-be-lawyers.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.  Today, firms 
concerned about having their bills scrutinized by clients who may take their 












Elite law firms tend to view pro bono cases as opportunities for 
junior attorneys to obtain generalist skills that will ultimately serve 
commercial clients who are unwilling to finance new attorney 
training and endure inevitable attorney errors.113  In fact, many law 
firms discourage more experienced attorneys, the practitioners most 
likely to possess the generalist skills, from undertaking pro bono 
work.114  Particularly in this context, Model Rule 1.1’s approach to 
defining competence without reference to outcomes or objective 
standards renders pro bono clients vulnerable to inexperienced 
attorney errors.  Novice attorneys assigned to developmental pro 
bono matters may receive less support precisely because decision 
makers view this charitable volunteering as an opportunity for the 
young attorney’s professional growth and satisfaction, not legal 
work of consequence to the firm’s bottom line.  As such, many 
attorneys involved in developmental pro bono work are poorly 
equipped to provide services that meet the minimum standards of 
competence or other ethical requirements.   
C. Conflicts, Identity, and Case Selection 
Not only do business imperatives and assignment practices work 
against ensuring attorney competence in pro bono cases, many law 
firms reject entire categories of public interest litigation in which 
their attorneys already possess significant experience.  Most 
practitioners recognize that encouraging attorneys to accept pro bono 
matters within their for-profit practice area generally improves 
attorney competence and increases case handling efficiency.115  Yet, 
                                                




114 Many junior associates have no experience speaking directly with clients.  
While in recent years firms have increasingly turned towards outsourcing such 
discovery-related tasks, junior associates still enjoy few opportunities to develop 
their client interviewing and oral advocacy skills relative to their public interest 
counterparts who generally conduct client intake and courtroom advocacy from 
their first days on the job.  Carpenter, supra note 8, at 72; Rhode, supra note 60, at 
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many firms reject cases in these areas based on their misperception 
that such matters present a “positional conflict” for the firm.   
A genuine positional conflict involves representation of “two 
unrelated clients in litigation before a court or administrative agency 
on opposing sides of the same legal issue.”116  Given the nature of 
elite firm practice, it is unlikely that many referred pro bono matters 
could place a firm in a true positional conflict.  Few prestigious law 
firms directly represent landlords in low-income neighborhoods or 
individual restaurant owners who violate minimum wage laws, for 
example.  In contrast, more liberally defined “business conflicts,” or 
the perception that prospective institutional clients will be less likely 
to hire the firm because of pro bono advocacy on behalf of certain 
poor people, are much more likely to surface.117   As Norman 
Spaulding suggests, an attorney’s perception of his or her client’s 
interests is inextricably linked with the attorney’s self-perception.  
Attorneys who experience a particularly close alignment with their 
clients’ business perspectives have “thick positional identities.”  
These lawyers may be unwilling to accept pro bono work 
inconsistent with the clients’ interests “out of fear that it may 
alienate their paying clients,” even when the matter presents no 
direct conflict under the Model Rules.118   
Many pro bono advocates accept this conflation of business 
interests and “positional conflicts.”  Not surprisingly, given pro 
bono’s relationship with law firms’ for-profit goals, many pro bono 
proponents fail to question the expansive definition of conflicts 
applied in the pro bono context.  PBI, for example, cautions law 
firms to avoid accepting pro bono cases that might present “issue 
conflicts” wherein the firm could be asked to “argue a legal theory 
which may not be in the best interest of a corporate client,”119 an 
                                                
116 John S. Dzienkowski, Positional Conflicts of Interest, 71 TEX. L. REV. 457, 
464–65 (1993). 
117 According to Sandefur, “law firms select pro bono projects with an eye to 
avoiding those that might antagonize existing or potential clients.”  Sandefur, 
supra note 26, at 103.  See also Rubinson, supra note 112, at 33 (“[M]any large 
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118 Spaulding, supra note 115, at 1418.  
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approach that goes well beyond the requirements to avoid a conflict 
under Model Rules 1.7–1.10.  
Corporate attorneys with thick positional identities dominate 
elite law firms.  In the for-profit context, this approach ensures that 
attorneys within the firm zealously advocate on behalf of their 
clients.  In the pro bono context, elite firms’ alignment with 
powerful institutional clients may work to the detriment of access to 
justice imperatives.  Nearly half of all of the nation’s largest law 
firms categorically refuse to accept plaintiff-side employment and 
labor cases and rarely engage in consumer and environmental pro 
bono work; nor do they readily accept civil rights matters that could 
offend paying clients, even when attorneys in those firms have 
extensive experience in the relevant subject matter or procedural 
rules.120   
Both existing and potential corporate clients exert significant 
pressure on law firm attorneys to accept pro bono matters outside of 
their areas of expertise.  This decreases the efficiency in pro bono 
work and increases the likelihood that novice attorneys who rely on 
their firms’ internal resources will receive insufficient support for 
quality control.121  Thus, the actual and potential financial interests 
of paying clients impact the interpretation of conflict rules in the pro 
bono context.  By influencing case selection, the business interests 
of future clients increase the probability that pro bono work will not 
be performed with the same resources and informal collegial control 
that define the firm’s standard practice.  Model Rule 6.1 imposes no 
countervailing duty on private sector attorneys to interpret conflicts 
more narrowly to facilitate access to justice—even when doing so 
might improve the quality of pro bono service.   
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D. Cultural Homogeneity and Legal Services Triage 
Class, cultural, and linguistic differences between attorneys and 
their clients can erect barriers to effective representation.122  The 
academic literature on cultural competence in legal service makes 
clear that ethnic, linguistic, and socioeconomic differences among 
individuals and between attorneys and their clients may impact the 
provision of legal services.123  However, the lack of diversity within 
elite law firms impacts justice gap pro bono work long before the 
first attorney-client encounter.  Just as with “positional conflicts,” 
cultural preferences and exclusionary practices rooted in cultural 
difference shape case screening and client referrals in ways that 
hinder pro bono’s access to justice objectives. 
Model Rule 1.2 states that “[l]egal representation should not be 
denied to people who are unable to afford legal services.”124  Yet, the 
impulse to provide an enjoyable experience for the pro bono attorney 
frequently results in case selection practices flatly inconsistent with 
Model Rule 1.2’s access to justice objective.  Many pro bono 
attorneys express a desire to work with “deserving clients.”125  On its 
face, the term “deserving” could mean nothing more than that the 
individual should have access to counsel; that is, every person 
experiencing a legal crisis deserves legal assistance.  In practice, 
however, the term “deserving” often functions as a code word 
signifying clients whose characteristics do not offend prevailing 
                                                
122 See generally Deborah Archer, There is No Santa Claus: The Challenge of 
Teaching the Next Generation of Civil Rights Lawyers in a “Post-Racial” Society, 
4 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 55, 68–71 (2013); Annette Wong, A Matter of 
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123 Bryant, supra note 80, at 41–42.  
124 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. 5. 
125 Cummings & Sandefur, supra note 7, at 104.  The ABA’s Military Pro Bono 
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social norms within the law firm or who might negatively reflect 
upon a firm’s image.126 
Pro bono advocates often ignore the impact that poverty-related 
prejudices can have on attorneys’ willingness to work with poor 
people in crisis.  As Michelle Jacobs explained, perceptions of 
whether particular impoverished individuals are “viewed as being 
‘undeserving’ or ‘unworthy’ extend to providers of legal services” 
and influence the quality and scope of assistance provided to poor 
clients.127  Jacobs’ limited empirical research on the degree to which 
the definition of “zealous” advocacy was tied to conceptions of 
social worth revealed, among other things, that law students varied 
their decisions to assist clients based on the client’s racial and class 
characteristics. 128   She also found that students’ assessment of 
“equality” as a guiding principle varied considerably depending on 
the ethnicity of the student.129  Since bar applicants need not undergo 
cultural competency or anti-bias training as a condition of their 
admission to practice, it is unlikely that law students’ attitudes 
towards serving hyper-marginalized individuals will radically 
transform once they become law firm associates assigned to pro 
bono matters.130 
The cultural landscape of elite law firms is poorly equipped to 
counter this bias and prepare pro bono attorneys for the diversity 
issues that arise in justice gap pro bono work.  On the contrary, it 
reflects recruiting and retention practices designed to ensure that the 
associates, partners and corporate clients share a common culture.  
Attorneys who are ethnic minorities and lawyers raised in low 
socioeconomic backgrounds seldom attain positions of authority 
within elite law firms.131  White attorneys constitute ninety-eight 
                                                
126 Generally speaking, attorneys tend to prefer pro bono clients who more closely 
resemble their paying clientele.  Richard Abel, The Paradoxes of Pro Bono, 78 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2443, 2448 (2010). 
127 Michelle S. Jacobs, Full Legal Representation for the Poor: The Clash Between 
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128 See id. at 269–75. 
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percent of the partners in the nation’s top one hundred law firms.132  
Moreover, the attorneys who practice in these firms are drawn 
overwhelmingly from the pool of graduates from highly ranked law 
schools.  Students at these institutions are twenty-four times more 
likely to have been raised in families at the top ten percent of 
earnings than in middle and lower income brackets.133  This lack of 
economic diversity within the elite sectors of the legal community 
exists even among the relatively few African-American and Latino 
attorneys who enter top tier law schools and elite firms.134  Such 
statistics paint an exceedingly grim picture of the true racial and 
socioeconomic homogeneity at law firms that are the most likely to 
accept justice gap pro bono cases.135 
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A Primer on Diversity, Discrimination, and Equality in the Legal Profession or 
Who Is Responsible for Pursuing Diversity and Why, 24 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 
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 The class and cultural tensions that can arise while representing 
indigent people often discomfit pro bono attorneys.136  This sector of 
the bar seldom has extensive first-hand exposure to the conditions of 
intergenerational poverty, identity-based discrimination, and 
systemic disadvantage commonly experienced by low-income, civil 
litigants.  Often the conditions of deep poverty common in justice 
gap lawyering test these attorneys’ desires to help a “deserving” 
client.  Theodore Fillette III, the Senior Managing Attorney of Legal 
Aid of North Carolina referred to this phenomenon the “Cinderella 
expectation syndrome” and explained: 
 
[S]ome volunteers have little experience with 
generationally poor persons and imagine that their pro 
bono clients are idyllic Cinderella prototypes who are 
industrious, polite, modest, grateful, and the victims of an 
evil stepmother or some equivalent villain.  In my view, 
all of the Cinderella clients are represented by Perry 
Mason or Matlock, leaving us with real clients who are 
burdened with economic and cultural disadvantages.137 
 
This perception of individual crises divorced from systemic 
disadvantage is consistent with the notion that individuals who are 
hard-working or dedicated to raising a family in an honorable way, 
or honest, cooperative, or the like should receive some reward for 
their individual character when legal services organizations allocate 
resources.138  Many pro bono coordinators and attorneys share their 
perspective and prefer a “good” pro bono experience that consists of 
representing an appreciative and cooperative client with a single 
legal problem who has no criminal background, mental health 
concerns, or substance abuse history.   
                                                                                                            
boards.  Legal services attorneys and poverty law practitioners are largely absent 
from both institutions. 
136 As Jacob explained, “The lack of sufficient economic resources can inject a 
constant level of instability and chaos into a client’s life.  This may be 
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137 Fillette, supra note 8, at 122.  
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In conceiving of the ideal, morale-boosting case, few pro bono 
attorneys envision engaging in strained conversations with hyper-
marginalized individuals.139  Based on my first-hand experience as 
an associate at a large, major market law firm, this is a feeling with 
which I am somewhat sympathetic.  Exacting billable hour 
requirements, job insecurity, and a lack of personal autonomy create 
enormous stress for law firm associates.  Consequently, the prospect 
of working with a client who may present a maze of legal problems 
and can appear to be uncooperative, unable to arrive at appointments 
on time, or complicit in their own crises is understandably 
unattractive.  To avoid this potential discomfort, some pro bono 
attorneys and coordinators simply refuse to serve the most 
vulnerable clients in need of civil legal assistance.  In so doing, elite 
law firms’ pro bono participation can distort a nonprofit legal 
services organization’s case handling priorities by reshaping the way 
nonprofit organizations select and refer pro bono cases.   
 Leonore Carpenter, an experienced nonprofit attorney, referred 
to law firms’ distortion of nonprofit legal services agendas as “triage 
conflict.”140  Carpenter cautioned, “[t]riage conflict arises when the 
case selection criteria of the public interest agency are directly 
challenged by another entity” and when “pro bono seeks to impose 
its business agenda on a public interest program” thereby 
destabilizing the nonprofit’s mission by forcing a “misallocation of 
scarce human capital resources.” 141   In justice gap pro bono 
initiatives, nonprofit attorneys who conduct community outreach and 
case screening constitute the primary human resources subject to law 
firm misappropriation.   
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Carpenter’s notion of “triage conflict” extends the discussion 
sparked by Paul Tremblay’s seminal article on “weighted triage” 
among poor clients.  Therein, Tremblay described appropriate and 
impermissible case selection criteria available to legal services 
attorneys who face an overwhelming demand for services. 142  
Among the principles legal services attorneys may ethically consider 
are: the degree to which attorney intervention will make a 
meaningful difference in the outcome of the dispute, conservation of 
scarce institutional resources, the goal of maximizing the collective 
benefit to the client community, prioritization of the “most serious” 
legal matters, and preference for cases in which the attorney is likely 
to achieve a favorable outcome over the long term instead of matters 
in which the attorney can only obtain short term relief.143  One 
impermissible factor to consider is a client’s perceived “social 
worth.”144  Tremblay explained that if such perceptions were applied 
in the triage context, “then clients deemed more deserving as the 
result of some personal qualities or character would warrant some 
privilege in the selection process.”145   
Triage conflict in the justice gap pro bono context misdirects a 
nonprofit organization’s case selection criteria by causing legal aid 
attorneys to favor poor clients with high “social worth” when 
referring matters to pro bono attorneys.  Some law firms 
straightforwardly inform nonprofit referral organizations that their 
attorneys are not interested in handling certain categories of 
individuals such as clients with criminal or substance abuse 
histories, for example.  Other firms do not categorically reject clients 
but simply decline to accept pro bono matters in which the client 
falls short of the “Cinderella” expectations alluded to above.  
Nonprofit organizations may respond to this reality by advising their 
staff to “select the most sympathetic clients available,” offering “the 
most meritorious claims to volunteers” and “not refer[ing] clients 
with mental difficulties.”146  The unfortunate effect of this approach 
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to pro bono work is that referring legal services organizations feel 
pressured to skim off easy clients (for example, speakers of standard 
English who are meticulous and punctual) and easy cases (for 
example, uncomplicated matters with a high likelihood of success) 
for their pro bono partners.  This violates Model Rule 1.2 and 
contravenes the principles articulated in both the Civil Legal Aid and 
Pro Bono Standards.  These rule violations are not simply 
ideological concerns.  They have the practical effect of concentrating 
cases and clients that require more robust advocacy resources within 
nonprofits instead of expanding the pool of attorneys available to the 
entire target population.  Ostensibly, justice gap pro bono exists to 
increase the resources available to low-income persons in crisis.  
Since, in many respects, pro bono service enhances the legitimacy of 
the profession as a whole, it is deeply troubling that attorneys’ lack 
of cultural competence frequently undermines this goal.147 
 Triage conflict is inconsistent with Pro Bono Standard 2.1 which 
requires legal services providers to “identify the most compelling 
needs of the low-income community” they serve.148  However, this is 
yet another area in which law firms are poorly positioned to regulate 
their ability to facilitate access to justice for poor people.  It also 
represents another lost opportunity for the ethics rules to set clearer 
boundaries for whether and how a client’s perceived social worth 
should enter the case selection process.  The ABA acknowledged 
that “most pro bono committees consider . . . the client” when 
deciding whether to accept a prospective pro bono matter.149  Yet, 
                                                
147 Spaulding, supra note 115, at 1421.   
148 Most poverty law organizations aim to reach the most vulnerable members of 
their client communities, those who are least able to self-advocate.  Investing 
resources into creating “feel good” opportunities for pro bono attorneys runs 
counter to the objective of prioritizing services for the most vulnerable members 
of the community.  Yet, “[r]elatively few firms engage in any systematic 
assessment of community needs or of the most cost-effective use of resources.  
Seldom do they even survey their own membership about giving priorities or 
attempt to monitor the satisfaction of clients or the social impact of particular 
initiatives. . . . The result is often a mismatch between public needs, partner 
priorities and associate satisfaction.”  Symposium, The Lawyer’s Role in a 
Contemporary Democracy, Promoting Access to Justice and Government 
Institutions, Rethinking the Public in Lawyers’ Public Service: Pro Bono, 
Strategic Philanthropy, and the Bottom Line, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 1435, 
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neither the committee’s report on Model Rule 6.1 implementation or 
subsequent commentary on the rules identify which client 
characteristics would be acceptable to consider when deciding 
whether to accept a case and which would be ethically impermissible 
to take into consideration.150  Moreover, Model Rule 6.1 fails to cite 
either the Civil Legal Aid or Pro Bono Standards 2.1 as guiding 
principles for pro bono attorneys. 
It is true that amending the Model Rules would not alter the 
demographics of elite law firms or automatically develop cultural 
competence among the young attorneys who are often assigned to 
work with pro bono clients.  Indeed, the existing Model Rules have 
not curbed many undesirable practices that disadvantage paying 
clients.  Nevertheless, the ABA’s choice to omit references to the 
Civil Legal Aid and Pro Bono Standards from Model 6.1 leaves 
nonprofit organizations and pro bono firms with little guidance on 
appropriate (and inappropriate) methods of pro bono case selection 
to counter existing biases against clients whose “social worth” is 
perceived to be low. 
E. Pro Bono Supervision 
In theory, the large firm pro bono model effectively functions 
precisely because such institutions aggregate resources, wisdom and 
supervisory capacity to facilitate the work of junior attorneys.  In 
reality, however, junior attorneys frequently handle pro bono cases 
with little or no supervision.  This is particularly unsettling since 
junior associates no longer receive the training and mentoring on 
paying matters that once characterized law firm practice and might 
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matters or indigent or unpopular clients.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 
6.2, cmt. 1.  The rule advises against refusing appointments simply because the 
client’s “character or cause” is “repugnant” to the appointed attorney.  The Model 
Code’s Ethical Considerations went further than the Model Rules in defining how 
client “unpopularity” should impact case acceptance.  Ethical Consideration 2-29 
included court appointments and “bar association” referrals within the rule on 
accepting appointments.  It distinguished between an attorney’s “personal feelings” 
and “community attitudes” that may be repugnant,” stating that the community 
norms for social work should not be a reason for rejecting a particular client or 












otherwise inform their pro bono work.151  Some ethics commentators 
have argued that in the years following the adoption of the Model 
Rules, firms have experienced a significant decline in informal 
mentoring.152  This decline, coupled with an increased pressure to 
bill for paid client work results in junior associates at firms being 
less capable of independently analyzing the ethical dilemmas that 
arise in day-to-day practice.153   
Previous iterations of the ethics rules offered more particularized 
guidance on supervision than what today’s junior associates 
encounter in the Model Rules.  Canon 6 of the Model Code, for 
example, included an affirmative obligation to provide guidance into 
an attorney’s ethical considerations.154  In contrast, Model Rules 5.1 
and 5.2 regarding the responsibilities of supervising attorneys 
principally address liability for professional misconduct, and impose 
no affirmative obligation on senior lawyers to develop junior 
attorneys’ competence.  In like manner, they do not specify the type 
of active participation and oversight will satisfy the “association” 
requirement of Rule 1.1.  In fact, Rule 5.1 leaves open the possibility 
that even a partner “in charge of a matter” lacks “supervisory 
authority” sufficient to confer responsibility for the rule infractions 
of subordinates.  Rule 5.2 merely discusses the circumstances under 
which a junior attorney may be absolved of her responsibility for 
actions undertaken at the behest of a supervisor.  Neither rule 
imposes an affirmative obligation on inexperienced attorneys to seek 
out supervisory input to ensure that clients, including nonpaying 
ones, receive competent services.  Within the law firm pro bono 
                                                
151 Bruce A. Green, Professional Challenges in Large Firm Practice, 33 
FORDHAM URB. L. J. 7, 13–15 (2005). 
152 See, e.g., Jean M. Cary, Teaching Ethics and Professionalism in Litigation: 
Some Thoughts, 28 STETSON L. REV. 305, 311–12 (1998) (noting that in the “fast-
paced, billable-hours-conscious . . . world of today . . . there is no formal or 
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153 Margaret Raymond, The Professionalization of Ethics, 33 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 
153, 161 (2005); see Green, supra note 151, at 15–16. 
154 See ABA MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, EC 6-2 (1983) (“A 
lawyer . . . has the additional ethical obligation to assist in improving the legal 
profession, and he may do so by participating in bar activities intended to advance 
the quality and standards of members of the profession.  Of particular importance 
is the careful training of his younger associates and the giving of sound guidance 












context, senior associates and partners are the attorneys most likely 
to possess the generalist skills needed to represent clients 
competently.  Yet, firms often fail to engage experienced 
practitioners in pro bono matters, even in a supervisory capacity, 
due, among other things, to the misperception that partners’ highly 
specialized skills are inapplicable to the pro bono representation.   
Attorney specialization is nothing new, but its impact on pro 
bono supervision is something that the Model Rules do not address 
and pro bono proponents fail to apprehend.  Today, attorneys at 
preeminent law firms are not simply litigators and transactional 
practitioners.  Law “office practice” narrowly tailored to offer 
business advice to corporate clients surpassed courtroom advocacy 
as the preeminent form of legal work among the elite members of the 
bar by the early twentieth century.155  By the 1930s, legal scholars 
had already begun to criticize the impact of business specialization 
and the lure of corporate practice on the ability of the legal market to 
serve “the poor man’s case.”156  The dramatic expansion of large law 
firms that occurred in the late twentieth century significantly 
increased the need for business lawyers to specialize their services to 
increase job security and marketability.157  Their firms expect them, 
from an increasingly early moment in their careers to become 
experts in, for example, the use of asset backed securities in 
structured finance or defense counsel in securities litigation.  That 
specialization requires a high degree of focus on the problems of a 
particular industry and encourages attorneys to see themselves as 
agents of that sector’s legal interests.  As a consequence, associates 
often overlook the general lawyering expertise of partners or 
consider it to be inapplicable to the “specialized” legal issues 
presented in the pro bono case.  Moreover, the pro bono clients 
themselves—indigent litigants with low dollar-figure claims—are 
                                                
155 See Michael Ariens, Know the Law: A History of Legal Specialization, 45 S.C. 
L. REV. 1003, 1022, 1038 (1994).   
156 Id.   
157 Timothy Hia, Que Sera, Sera? The Future of Specialization in Large Law 
Firms, COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 541, 551 (2002) (“From the 1970s to the 1990s, large 
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individuals so dissimilar from the firm’s corporate clientele that their 
legal issues appear entire foreign to the partner.  This misperception, 
coupled with the Model Rules’ lack of readily actionable advice 
regarding pro bono supervision harms the practice of public interest 
law in distinct yet intersecting ways.158   
 The ABA acknowledged shortly after adopting Model Rule 6.1 
that without robust supervisory protocols in place, “the pressure of 
other [paying] work is more likely to lead to the improper discharge 
of obligations to pro bono clients.” 159   Maples v. Thomas, 160 
discussed in Section III-A, supra, provides a startling example of 
how pro bono supervision failures can cause serious harm to indigent 
clients.  While media coverage of the case has fixated on the so-
called “mailroom mix up” that resulted in return of a copy of the 
Alabama court’s decision to the state clerk’s office,161 that focus 
obscures the multiple ways in which the firm lacked adequate 
systems of supervision for pro bono work.  As a preliminary matter, 
the firm allowed two junior associates to leave the firm without 
reassigning their pro bono case.  The large firm approach to staffing 
corporate matters makes such egregious failures in communication 
and case oversight unlikely to occur, irrespective of any professional 
conduct rules.  However, without a profit motive, image 
enhancement potential or legal malpractice threat defining their 
practice norms, firms have little incentive to supervise pro bono 
matters in a way that protects against associate error. 162   The 
                                                
158 Matthew Paul Crouch, In the Aftermath: Responsibility and Professionalism in 
the Wake of Disaster, 65 S.C. L. REV. 465, 482–83 (2013) (citing Wiley A. 
Branton, Symposium, Katrina and the Rule of Law in the Time of Crisis: Natural 
Disasters and the Rule of Law: Professional Responsibility in Crisis, 51 HOW. L. J. 
677, 728 (2008); see also Cummings and Sandefur, supra note 7, at 102–03 (citing 
survey responses in which attorneys believed that “in some areas the [relatively 
inexperienced] associate knows more than the partner” with significantly greater 
knowledge of general lawyering skills and ethical obligations). 
159 Tyrrell, supra note 47, at 11. 
160 Maples v. Thomas, 132 S.Ct. 912, 914 (2012). 
161 See, e.g., Adam Liptik, Justices Rule for Inmate After Mailroom Mix-up, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 19, 2012), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/19/us/cory-
r-maples-must-be-given-second-chance-after-mailroom-mix-up-justices-
rule.html?_r=0. 
162 Putting aside the case handling failures that nearly cost Mr. Maples his capital 
appeal, the law firm’s violation of the duty of loyalty is perhaps a more shocking 












stunning lack of supervision and other ethical duties on display in 
Maples is likely to arise in major law firms only when attorneys 
serve clients on a pro bono basis.  The ethics rules should, but do not, 
advise against this foreseeable reality.   
 Public interest organizations devote considerable resources to 
micromanaging referred pro bono cases in the absence of law firm 
supervision, often at the expense of the nonprofits’ case handling 
capacity.163  Pro bono attorneys frequently conceive of the referring 
public interest attorneys as both supervisors and sources of logistical 
support, notwithstanding the existing supervisory structures within 
their law firms.164  In the same vein, associates who view their pro 
bono engagements primarily as sources of professional development 
often rely on nonprofit staff to offer detailed input into their case 
handling, even in the absence of a co-counseling agreement.165  The 
hours that nonprofit attorneys spend providing “support” to pro bono 
lawyers can exceed the time they would have spent handling the case 
themselves.  From an ethics perspective, these ongoing requests for 
help lay bare the law firms’ noncompliance with the Model Rules’ 
supervision guidelines.  Nevertheless, nonprofit attorneys who 
compete for much needed pro bono assistance may feel compelled to 
closely supervise pro bono attorneys as a way to attract volunteers.  
In so doing, their supervision of law firm associates, outside of the 
co-counseling context, encourages firms to violate Model Rules 5.1 
                                                                                                            
interest between itself and Mr. Maples by “not ced[ing] Maples’ representation to 
a new attorney” due to its “interest in avoiding damage to its own reputation.” 
Maples, 132 S.Ct. at 925 n.8. 
163 Carpenter, supra note 8, at 71.  
164 In my own experience, associates who become busy on paying client matters 
frequently ask to “give back” a referred client to nonprofit organizations, even 
after the firm has executed a retainer agreement with that individual.  In one 
immigration case my organization referred to a major New York City law firm, the 
two associates assigned to represent the client admitted that they were unable to 
give the case “the attention it deserves” in light of the client’s limited English 
proficiency.  They then asked if the attorneys who screened the matter could “step 
in” since their billable work had become more demanding.  This perception of 
joint supervision was also present in the MC v. GC, a New York divorce case.  MC 
v. GC, 25 Misc.3d 217, 218 nn.2–3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2009). 
165 The LSC’s Pro Bono Task Force found that pro bono attorneys require, among 
other things, “a commitment that there is someone at the legal aid organization 
they can call for advice and encouragement.” PRO BONO REPORT, supra note 28, 












and 5.2 and functions as a disincentive for firms to improve their pro 
bono case oversight.  Both pro bono programs and clients suffer as a 
consequence.  
IV. CONTEMPORARY PRO BONO PRACTICE AND INADEQUACIES IN THE 
MODEL RULES 
A. Ambiguity in the Professional Conduct Rules 
Since law firms themselves have no market-based rationale for 
policing the quality of services provided to pro bono clients, the 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct should assume an even greater 
role in regulating attorney behavior in this area.  Nevertheless, the 
ABA has not reformed the Model Rules to provide sufficient 
guidance on how lawyers in private practice should navigate the 
complexities of pro bono service.  As discussed more fully in 
Section II-C, supra, the ABA has promulgated standards to guide the 
work of nonprofit administrators and full-time poverty lawyers.  
However, those standards expressly exclude law firms, leaving those 
attorneys on their own to decide how, if at all, the existing Model 
Rules apply to the pro bono work they perform. 
 The explanatory comments that follow Rule 6.1 do not require 
attorneys to offer the same scope or caliber of serve that they would 
normally provide to paying clients.  Commentary to Rule 6.2 comes 
closest to providing guidance to pro bono attorneys regarding their 
ethical obligations to nonpaying clients.  It says: 
 
An appointed lawyer has the same obligations to 
the client as retained counsel, including the 
obligations of loyalty and confidentiality, and is 
subject to the same limitations on the client-
lawyer relationship, such as the obligation to 
refrain from assisting the client in violation of the 
Rules.166 
 
That Model Rule 6.1’s commentary does not expressly include pro 
bono clients among those entitled to equal application of the Rules is 
                                                












particularly striking given the structures that exist to protect clients 
who are appointed counsel and subject to Rule 6.2’s guidelines.   
 Typically, assigned counsel programs administered through 
courts and bar associations impose experience requirements and 
performance standards on attorneys that far exceed the “competence” 
defined under Model Rule 1.1.  For example, federal statutes specify 
the level of experience required for private attorneys to serve 
indigent criminal defendants through the Criminal Justice Act 
program.167  California’s appellate defense panel rules require panel 
applicants to demonstrate that they have “sufficient experience, 
knowledge and skill to perform the requisite tasks with a minimum 
amount of assistance from the administrator.” 168   Appointed 
attorneys must also submit “recent writing samples” that evince his 
or her “strong research and writing skills, including demonstrating 
the ability to analyze facts; recognize, analyze, research, organize 
and argue issues; use persuasive analogies and distinctions in citing 
precedent; and communicate clearly and concisely.”169  In New York, 
individual attorneys who participate in assigned counsel programs 
are required to describe, among other qualifications, how their 
advocacy in at least one case “produced a beneficial result that was 
outside the norm for that particular type of case” as a condition of 
recertifying their appointment eligibility.170  Similarly, the Juvenile 
Court panel overseen by the Chicago Bar Association requires 
program applicants to identify, inter alia, details about the attorney’s 
trial and appellate experience, the names of three attorneys 
experienced in the relevant practice area who can serve as references, 
                                                
167 See 18 U.S.C. § 3599(b) (“If the appointment is made before judgment, at least 
one attorney so appointed must have been admitted to practice in the court in 
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not less than three years [sic] experience in the actual trial of felony prosecutions 
in that court.”). 
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COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA (2012), available at 
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169 Id.  
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and information about the attorney’s language skills. 171   This 
approach is consistent with that of assigned counsel projects in 
Massachusetts, Florida, and other jurisdictions.172  In contrast, most 
pro bono initiatives accept volunteers without imposing any 
experience-related restrictions on participation.  While appointed 
counsel programs generally exist to guarantee due process rights not 
present in many justice gap pro bono cases, there is no legal basis for 
subjecting clients facing urgent matters such as those involving 
imminent eviction, debt collection actions, and child custody 
disputes to a lesser standard of professional conduct.  
 
B. Model Rule 1.1 and the Challenge of Developmental Pro Bono 
 
By placing it at the beginning of the Model Rules, the rule 
framers established competence as the bedrock of an attorney’s 
ethical obligations.  The professional duty to provide competent 
representation first appeared in the ABA’s Model Code in 1970.173  
Many, but not all, of the aspirational statements set forth in Canon 6 
of the Model Code’s Ethical Considerations were incorporated into 
Model Rule 1.1.  For example, Ethical Consideration 6-2 noted the 
importance of “training younger associates” and included “the giving 
of sound guidance” as part of an attorney’s duty to provide and 
promote competent service.174  Canon 6’s explanatory notes made 
clear that a client had “a right to expect that the lawyer will have 
devoted his time and energies to . . . know where to look for the 
                                                




172 Committee for Public Counsel Services Assigned Counsel Manual Policies and 
Procedure, Ch. 3, MASSACHUSETTS COMMITTEE FOR PUBLIC COUNSEL 
SERVICES (2014), available at  
http://www.publiccounsel.net/private_counsel_manual/CURRENT_MANUAL_20
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answers” to the client’s problems and “to know how to advise to the 
best of his legal talents and sensibilities.”175  The notes to Canon 6 
also cited the New York case of Degen v. Steinbrink176 in which the 
court affirmed, “[i]f the attorney is not competent to skillfully and 
properly perform the work, he should not undertake the service.”177   
 The ABA’s Model Rules mandate competent representation, but 
they do so without referencing outcomes or attorney work product 
quality; nor do they underscore the rights of clients that were 
included in Canon 6 of the Model Code.  The lack of objective 
criteria in the Model Rules’ articulation of ethical values increases 
the likelihood that ethical norms will be applied in a more context-
specific fashion.  In the case of law firm pro bono service, the 
decision not to include more specific measures of the knowledge, 
preparation, and thoroughness required to provide competent service 
inadequately instructs novice attorneys, especially those who 
practice without robust supervision.178   
 Rule 1.1 requires attorneys to possess “the legal knowledge, skill, 
thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the 
representation without identifying any end result of those 
“reasonably necessary” actions.”179  The comments to Model Rule 
1.1 focus exclusively on an attorney’s subjective assessment of 
competence and his or her individual perceptions of adequate 
preparation.  They state: “A lawyer can provide adequate 
representation in a wholly novel field through necessary study.”180  
Nevertheless, without some reference to the desired outcome of the 
representation, the comment leaves attorneys with little practical 
guidance with which to assess “adequacy” of services or “necessary” 
preparation.  Nothing in Rule 1.1 limits attorney competence to the 
knowledge and skill possessed at the moment an attorney accepts a 
new matter, an omission that facilitates assignment of developmental 
                                                
175 ABA MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, CANON 6 n.1. 
176 Degen v. Steinbrink, 195 N.Y.S. 810, 814 (1922), aff’d mem., 142 N.E. 328 
(1923). 
177 MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, CANON 6 n.3. 
178 Even outside of the pro bono context, the Model Rules’ generality and 
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supra note 112, at 714.  
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pro bono matters to attorneys who lack basic training and 
preparation.181  Attorneys with few generalist skills are left to define 
for themselves what amounts to “reasonably necessary” knowledge 
and “reasonable preparation” to handle the case competently.182   
Some critics of the Model Rules have noted that how “a lawyer 
performs is not regarded as relevant to the lawyer’s competence.”183  
This is certainly true in the pro bono context.184  Under a strict 
reading of Rule 1.1, an attorney need not possess knowledge and 
skill sufficient to make violation of other ethics rules or court 
requirements unlikely.  Likewise, the attorney has no affirmative 
obligation to possess knowledge and skill sufficient to guarantee a 
reasonable chance of success at trial.  The Model Rules provide few 
objective indicators of what passes for “zeal” in the context of client 
advocacy.185  For the reasons discussed in Section II-B, supra, this 
lack of guidance is largely irrelevant in the work of elite law firms 
where well-heeled clients who pay exorbitant fees can rightly expect 
competition for their business.  Pro bono clients at the mercy of free 
legal services providers wield no equivalent power to defend against 
attorney incompetence. 
 Furthermore, an inexperienced practitioner could interpret some 
of Model Rule 1.1’s commentary to suggest that pro bono matters 
are, by their nature, subject to lower standards for knowledge and 
preparation than cases typically handled by private law firms.  The 
explanatory comments state that the “required attention and 
preparation” for an attorney to meet the competence standard “are 
determined in part by what is at stake; major litigation and complex 
transactions ordinarily require more extensive treatment than matters 
of lesser complexity or consequence.”186  Attorneys in elite firms 
routinely handle cross-border transactions and multimillion-dollar 
disputes.  For them, justice gap pro bono will rarely appear to 
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present “major” litigation issues or matters of great financial 
consequence.  This is particularly true when the attorney handling 
the pro bono matter has had few, if any, opportunities to witness the 
cascading disasters that flow from a denial of government benefits, 
eviction or other legal crises that arise in the lives of civil legal aid 
clients.  The Rule’s suggestion that matters of lesser complexity may 
be subject to a reduced standard of competence is especially 
problematic in light of the negative attitudes towards poor clients 
addressed by Jacobs and others.187 
 The ABA recently reviewed the Model Rules, including Rule 1.1, 
to evaluate whether changes in the profession necessitated a 
clarification of “competent” service.  Nevertheless, the Ethics 20/20 
Commission’s revisions to Model Rule 1.1 add little clarity to how 
attorneys can objectively assess competence in pro bono 
representation or otherwise.  The amended commentary states that 
attorneys “should keep abreast of changes in the law and its practice, 
including the benefits and risks associated with relevant technology” 
to comply with Model Rule 1.1.188  The rule revisions also address 
legal outsourcing, including “nonfirm lawyers” within the scope of 
Rule 1.1.  The Ethics 20/20 revisions failed to incorporate client-
centered, objective measures of attorney competence that could 
assist attorneys in evaluating their professional conduct when 
competition for profit and the malpractice threat do not otherwise 
define competent service. 
C. Model Rule 1.18 and Pro Bono Referral Practices 
 The justice gap pro bono model significantly alters the contours 
of attorney-client relationships by including multiple 
intermediaries—nonprofit referring organizations and non-practicing, 
pro bono coordinators—into the case selection, conflicts checking 
and engagement initiation processes.  Nonprofit organizations 
typically serve as the first point of contact for prospective, pro bono 
clients.  Law firms with formal pro bono programs generally do not 
solicit their own indigent clients, even though Model Rule 7.3 would 
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permit them to do so.189  Instead, these firms typically rely on the 
staff of nonprofit organizations to conduct community outreach, 
meet with prospective clients, and “screen” individual cases for 
placement suitability before referring clients to pro bono 
coordinators within the firm.  The pro bono coordinator reviews the 
matter, distributes information about the prospective case with 
attorneys at her firm and, if successful in her placement efforts, 
initiates a conflicts check.  Coordinators may occasionally reach out 
to firms in search of a pro bono opportunity that will satisfy an 
associate’s personal or professional development interests.   
 Pro bono coordinators aim to connect associates with pro bono 
cases that will not interfere with the associate’s obligations on 
billable matters and will result in overall associate satisfaction.  To 
achieve these objectives, coordinators may ask the nonprofit 
organization’s “screeners” to disclose additional facts about the 
matter beyond what is required to check for potential conflicts.  In 
my experience as a law firm associate assigned to pro bono matters 
and a public interest attorney who has placed hundreds of pro bono 
cases with law firms, I have observed that the coordinator’s goal is 
generally to assess the complexity of the case and desirability of 
working with a specific client.  The coordinator and pro bono 
attorney may ask the prospective client to undertake additional steps 
as a condition of securing pro bono representation.  In adoption cases, 
for example, pro bono coordinators may agree to accept a referred 
case only if the prospective adoptive parent procures extrajudicial 
consents from the child’s biological parents to avoid contested 
matters or lengthy due diligence searches.  When assessing public 
benefits claims, coordinators may inquire about a prospective pro 
bono client’s prior criminal or substance abuse history regardless of 
the legal arguments at stake.  Coordinators may also probe the merits 
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of particular claims and defenses to avoid exposing associates to 
litigation in which the associate is unlikely to prevail.  Even after the 
firm accepts the representation, nonprofit attorneys often act as an 
intermediary, at least in the preliminary stages of the relationship 
between the indigent client and pro bono law firm.   
 This case selection and referral arrangement fundamentally 
restructures the relationships among the attorneys and prospective 
clients contemplated by Rule 1.18 of the Model Rules.  Model Rule 
1.18 was adopted to protect prospective clients by making pre-
retention communications confidential and addresses limitations on 
pre-retention disclosures required for conflicts purposes.190  Model 
Rule 1.18 had no counterpart in the Model Code and was included 
by the Ethics 2000 Commission “in response to the Commission’s 
concern that important events occur in the period during which a 
lawyer and prospective client are considering whether to form a 
client-lawyer relationship” that were inadequately addressed in other 
Model Rules.191  The most recent revisions to Rule 1.18, adopted in 
2012 in conjunction with the Ethics 20/20 review, overlook the 
growing importance of pro bono work in legal services delivery for 
the poor.  Those amendments primarily address changes that expand 
the methods through which prospective clients contact lawyers.  
Tellingly, those provisions are crafted to protect attorneys from 
being forced into a relationship as a result of unilateral 
communications from prospective clients and individuals seeking to 
disqualify counsel.192   
 While Model Rule 1.18 was drafted to address client 
vulnerabilities and confidentiality concerns, nothing in it establishes 
boundaries on the nature and scope of information that pro bono 
attorneys can gather on prospective pro bono clients; nor does it 
suggest any consequences for pre-retention conduct in the pro bono 
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context.  If, for example, a pro bono client obtains documents at a 
law firm’s behest as a condition of securing representation, the 
question of whether the client reasonably can conclude that an 
attorney-client relationship exists after he or she secures the 
requested material remains unresolved in the rule.  The rule also fails 
to address the nonprofit organization’s concern that by acting as an 
intermediary between the client and pro bono firm during these 
stages of the relationship, the client may justifiably presume that the 
nonprofit attorneys are actually her lawyers, regardless of the referral 
arrangement that the nonprofit and law firm have established.  
Nothing in Model Rule 1.18’s explanatory comments resolves these 
practical concerns.  Likewise, Model Rule 1.2 regarding the 
allocation of authority between client and lawyers provides that 
attorneys “shall abide by a client’s decisions concerning the 
objectives of the representation and . . . shall consult with the client 
as to the means by which they are to be pursued.”193  However, it is 
often the pro bono coordinator and an attorney from the referring 
non-profit legal organization who negotiates over the scope of 
service the law firm will provide on a pro bono basis, without any 
input from the pro bono client. 
 
D. Model Rule 1.4 and Effective Communication with Pro Bono 
Clients 
 Some critics of the Model Rules maintain that the rules ignore 
and exclude ‘outsider’ clients, low-income or minority individuals 
who constitute the bulk of the pro bono clients referred for free legal 
services at major law firms. 194   Others have argued that the 
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sociocultural understandings that inform the Model Rules are 
inconsistent with many aspects of practice outside of the elite law 
firm context where clients frequently lack understanding of legal 
norms due to “different linguistic and cultural understandings.”195  I 
propose that the Model Rules, particularly Model Rule 1.4 on 
communication, offer little practical guidance for pro bono attorneys 
who share limited common understanding with their clients and that 
lack of instruction hinders pro bono practice.   
 Under Model Rule 1.4, attorneys must “promptly inform the 
client of any decision or circumstance” that requires the client’s 
“informed consent, as defined in Rule 1.0(e)” and reasonably consult 
with the client about the means by which the client's objectives are 
to be accomplished.”196  As the representation progresses, Rule 1.4 
requires the lawyer to “keep the client reasonably informed about the 
status of the matter” and “promptly comply with reasonable requests 
for information” from the client.197  The Rule further requires the 
lawyer to “explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to 
permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the 
representation.”198   
 The Rule’s comments highlight the need for clarification of how 
this standard should apply in the context of justice gap lawyering.  
For example, they explain “[i]n some situations—depending on both 
the importance of the action under consideration and the feasibility 
of consulting with the client—this duty will require consultation 
prior to taking action.”199  However, the commentary outlines no 
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factors to be considered by an attorney who must decide whether the 
action requires prior consultation with the client.   
 Even attorneys who do not routinely represent indigent clients 
recognize that discussions with “bewildered, distraught, and legally 
inexperienced clients must take different forms than communication 
with legally sophisticated clients with well-defined objectives.”200  
In poverty law practices, clients are also likely to have disabilities, 
limited English proficiency or other characteristics that challenge 
effective communication.  Pro bono attorneys from elite firm 
settings must navigate these communication-related concerns with 
individual clients while being acculturated to work with institutional 
clients who share few, if any, of these attributes.   
 Not only do these attorneys lack professional experience 
communicating with clients in crisis, the Model Rules’ indeterminate 
approach to describing effective communication standards provides 
little guidance to pro bono practitioners.  Model Rule 1.4’s 
comments regarding attorney-client communications mention 
nothing about working with clients who have limited English 
proficiency or use sign language to communicate.  Model Rule 1.4 
also requires attorneys to communicate to the extent necessary to 
keep a “comprehending, responsible adult” informed about the 
representation.201  Neither the text of the rule nor its interpretative 
comments describe which concepts an adult must “comprehend” to 
meet this reasonable client standard; nor do they define what makes 
an adult “responsible.”  How can an attorney properly discharge his 
or her ethical obligations under Model Rule 1.4 with an adult client 
who is legally “competent” but has had very little formal education?  
To what degree must attorneys educate their clients about the 
American court system when the client is unfamiliar with our 
adversarial process?  What steps should an attorney take to ensure 
that his client with limited English proficiency truly comprehends 
the information the attorney needs to share?  The Model Rules and 
their interpretative commentary offer no instruction in these areas.  
To the extent the Model Rules’ approach relies on “informal 
normative frameworks provided by communities of practice” to 
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supplement and particularize ethics norms, pro bono attorneys do not 
benefit from such institutional support.202 
 The client base of the nonprofit organization involved in the MC 
v. GC case discussed at the outset resembles that of many legal 
services organizations in major cities that refer indigent clients 
through pro bono initiatives.  The overwhelming majority of its 
clients are people of color, and one third of them live in “the poorest 
urban county in the United States.”203  Twenty-five percent of their 
clients are non-English speakers. 204   Not only do its clients 
experience high levels of poverty and a lack of language access to 
essential services, more than eighty percent of them are domestic 
abuse survivors.  The percentages of clients in each of these 
categories may vary at nonprofit legal organizations around the 
country, but domestic violence, family law, housing and public 
benefits are prevalent within legal services practices for low-income 
people.205  Moreover, income eligibility at LSC-grantee organization 
and other legal nonprofits is generally restricted to extremely low-
income individuals. 206   Any pro bono attorney who agrees to 
represent clients referred from these programs should be aware of 
the financial and other needs of client populations from ethnically 
and linguistically diverse populations, as well as persons with 
disabilities and individuals who have experienced significant 
trauma.207 
 The ABA’s Standing Committee on Pro Bono offers few 
resources to develop pro bono attorneys’ cultural competence and 
client sensitivity.  It prepared a two-page brochure that outlines tips 
for working with clients from “generational poverty” backgrounds 
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but largely overlooks the client demographics that distinguish justice 
gap pro bono from for-profit representation.208  Similarly, not one 
publication in the PBI’s clearinghouse is devoted to exploring racial, 
cultural or linguistic diversity in pro bono practice.209  It is true that 
some law firms and pro bono advocates provide cultural competency 
training to their attorneys and some academic institutions have 
developed relevant resources for volunteer lawyers, 210 but these 
programs amount to more of an exception than a rule in pro bono 
practice.  
 Attorneys who accept referred pro bono matters may be hesitant 
to embrace the notion that “culture” matters in their definition of 
competence or application of ethics rules.  They might even regard 
cultural competency as an abstraction more relevant to political 
correctness debates than to effective representation—until they find 
themselves in an ethical conundrum with their pro bono client.  
Insofar as individual ethics rules allocate decision-making authority 
between an attorney and client or require the client’s informed 
consent, an attorney’s professional conduct takes as its foundation 
certain shared understandings with his or her client.  Cultural 
competence facilitates this shared understanding.  An attorney who 
meaningfully apprehends how a client’s beliefs, resources, and 
values shape the client’s legal objectives is much better equipped to 
formulate a case strategy and comply with the decision-making 
allocation rules than an attorney who has only a limited 
understanding of the client’s perspective.211   
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E. The Need for Comprehensive, Pro Bono-Focused Review of the 
Model Rules 
 The specific Model Rules referenced here are not the only ethics 
rules that inadequately address the significant changes wrought by 
justice gap pro bono programs.  Most significantly for purposes of 
this article, the Model Rules say nothing about a pro bono attorney’s 
obligations to the clients to whom the legal services are provided.  In 
fact, the Model Rules only address the pro bono attorney’s rights to 
refuse to provide pro bono services that would cause “undue 
financial burden” or involve clients “so repugnant to the lawyer as to 
be likely to impair the client-lawyer relationship or the lawyer's 
ability to represent the client.”212   
 The lack of ethical advice on these fundamental questions is not 
merely an academic issue.  While working on pro bono matters as a 
law firm associate and with pro bono attorneys, I have encountered 
lawyers who appear to be genuinely confused about their client’s 
identity.  They often proceed on the misunderstanding that they are 
rendering a service to the referring nonprofit organization rather than 
the referred individual, a misapprehension exacerbated by many law 
firms’ financial contributions to nonprofit organizations.213  It is 
hardly surprising that, in the absence of ethical guidance highlighting 
the needs of pro bono clients, these disadvantaged individuals 
receive inadequate attention by the very attorneys retained to act as 
their advocates.   
F.  Ethical Ambiguities in Legal “Backwaters” 
Some argue that ABA’s ethics rules serve more of a symbolic 
function rather than an instrumentalist one. 214   While the 
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indeterminate approach to articulating ethics norms in the Model 
Rules lends some support to this contention, I agree with ethics 
scholars who conclude that formal professional conduct rules serve 
three interrelated functions: they “protect the interests of clients, 
safeguard the integrity of the legal system, and encourage high 
standards of attorney conduct.” 215   Within that framework, the 
application of legal ethics is controlled more by the cultural norms of 
a particular practice community and cultivated habits of individual 
attorneys rather than formal rules adopted by the ABA.216   
Each subsector of the legal community, from securities defense 
litigators at white shoe law firms, to public defenders in Legal Aid 
offices around the country, establishes internal norms for 
professional conduct.217  This “common law of ethics” consists of 
“understandings that lawyers observe in their dealings with one 
another . . . and with the courts” as well as social norms about how 
attorneys within the particular community should treat clients.218  In 
the various subsectors of elite firm practice, conventions on 
competence, supervision, relationship formation, communication and 
other ethical duties are largely shaped by the financial accountability 
imposed by clients and the demands of adversaries.  Elite law firms 
that dominate the pro bono landscape develop thick positional 
identities and associated practice conventions that reflect their 
paying clients’ business needs.  When attorneys in these firms 
represent indigent clients on a pro bono basis, they depart from the 
familiar confines of their practice norms and enter into an unfamiliar 
terrain of low-status legal work where the customs of professional 
conduct to which they are accustomed seem inapplicable.   
Stratification and status hierarchies in legal work exist in both 
the for-profit and public interest sectors and are directly relevant to 
the application of professional conduct norms in the pro bono 
context.  The ethical concerns addressed herein are less likely to 
occur when high status attorneys engage in pro bono work that 
impacts their stature within their subsector of the legal community.  
For example, class action litigation in civil rights matters represents 
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a kind of “high status” public interest practice that is not the 
mainstay of nonprofit lawyers who offer direct services to poor 
individuals.219  Similarly, death penalty appeals can be construed as 
a form of high status, public interest work inasmuch as those cases 
have less to do with the facts surrounding an indigent persons’ 
experience and are more concerned with protecting the integrity of 
the legal system as a whole.220  What most distinguishes justice gap 
pro bono initiatives from high status, impact litigation is that they 
connect the most elite, highly compensated members of the bar with 
work that has been traditionally devalued within the legal 
community.   
Direct representation of poor persons in individual disputes over 
essentials of life is the least prestigious sector of the profession.  The 
prevailing assumption is that full-time poverty lawyers are “‘low’ 
status lawyers who perform that kind of work because they cannot 
get other jobs.”221  Marina Zaloznaya and Laura Beth Nielsen who 
conducted ethnographic research into Chicago’s legal aid system 
found that poverty lawyers continue to experience “ideological 
marginality,” struggling with their commitment to social justice in a 
profession that accords prestige to profit-generating work, “task 
marginality” as they complete administrative tasks, and “status 
marginalization” within the professional, particularly as they 
advance in their careers.222  Civil legal services attorneys are often 
derided by others within the legal community as being less capable 
practitioners than their colleagues involved in impact litigation or 
other types of public interest legal work.223   
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In her incisive analysis of status and perceived value within the 
public interest community, Rebecca Sharpless explained that “[a] 
hierarchy of helping that puts individual service at the bottom has 
existed in progressive lawyering theory and practice for the last half 
century.”224  Sharpless noted that the high volume, poverty, and 
overwhelmingly female make-up of civil legal services clients 
parallels the relatively non-elite, lower income, largely female and 
non-white composition of many civil legal aid lawyers. 225  
Prejudices and misconceptions related to these characteristics have 
resulted in denigration of direct legal services work and skewed the 
perception of work done by civil legal services attorneys such that 
direct services have been referred to as the “backwater” of 
practice.226  While “the top status hemisphere of the legal profession 
contains corporate lawyers,” the legal community’s “bottom 
hemisphere” is populated by a disproportionately female group of 
attorneys who represent individuals unable to afford counsel.227  
Justice gap pro bono initiatives transport “top status” lawyers into 
the world of “bottom hemisphere” work without offering a clear 
framework to guide attorneys’ professional conduct. 
 These perceptions of relative value within the legal profession 
described by Zaloznaya, Nielsen, Sharpless and others influence 
attorneys’ interpretation of existing professional conduct norms.  In 
the case of impact litigation or other forms of high status pro bono 
work, attorneys at elite firms will perform in accordance with the 
ethical norms that define his or her professional identity.  Not only 
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will a high status matter confer prestige upon the pro bono attorney 
and firm, it will require less of the non-legal administrative work 
typically associated with poverty law practice that results in the “task 
marginality” that Zaloznaya and Nielsen described.228  Arguing a 
high profile civil rights case, for example, can advance a young 
attorney’s reputation within and beyond his or her firm.  On the 
other hand, justice gap pro bono typically does not expose junior 
associates to substantive areas of the law that directly relate to a 
firm’s for-profit practices, nor do these matters usually involve high-
profile issues that could raise the attorney’s profile within his or her 
legal community subsector.  Direct legal services, by definition, 
require one-on-one interactions with disadvantaged clients in crisis, 
advocacy in slow-moving and indifferent bureaucracies like public 
assistance offices, and overextended state courts.  Child custody, 
divorce proceedings, eviction prevention, and administrative 
hearings on public benefit denials rarely make headlines or offer 
opportunities for elite practitioners to enhance their professional 
stature.   
Elite firms construct a narrative about their attorneys’ superior 
educational pedigree and the intellectual complexity of corporate 
practice, a narrative that equates “the large amount of money at stake 
in large firm practice with social importance.”229  It follows, then, 
that pro bono cases in which little money is at stake involving clients 
with low social status are foreign to the legal community and the 
ethical conventions that normally govern their behavior.  These 
attorneys consider pro bono work on behalf of indigent clients to be 
a charitable activity, not legal work, precisely because to think 
otherwise would challenge their positional identity.  Yet, it is the 
lawyer’s positional identity and associated practice conventions that 
regulate day-to-day professional conduct by filling in existing gaps 
in the Model Rules.  For example, elite firms construct cross-practice 
legal teams to comprehensively handle their corporate clients’ legal 
concerns, notwithstanding the vague competence requirements of 
Model Rule 1.1.  Similarly, elite firms interpret the allocation of 
authority between themselves and their institutional clients by 
deferring to their clients’ superior understanding of the financial 
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consequences of legal choices regardless of how applicable ethics 
rules allocate decision-making authority.  Unfortunately for many 
indigent clients, the pro bono attorney’s departure from an elite 
practitioner status results in a deviation from the “common law of 
ethics” that normally governs their conduct.230  
Thus, Justice gap pro bono exists in this state of ethical 
liminality between the high status professional standards common to 
the elite segment of private practice and charity work associated with 
“undistinguished” lawyers for the poor.  Any practical guidance 
aimed at protecting pro bono clients and encouraging higher and 
particularized standards of ethical conduct would strengthen the 
integrity of the system of legal services delivery. 
V.   CONCLUSION 
Few would contest the notion that Model Rule 6.1 has played an 
important role in increasing the number of attorneys who offer free 
or reduced fee legal assistance to low-income persons.  Yet in many 
important ways, the thorny and nuanced balancing of interests 
involved in justice gap pro bono initiatives has received inadequate 
attention from the ABA, state-level ethics codes, and pro bono 
advocates.  Pro bono work continues to function as an afterthought 
in the area of professional conduct.  Even the ABA’s Ethics 20/20 
Commission charged with reviewing the Model Rules to “keep pace 
with social change and the evolution of law practice” missed an 
important opportunity to improve ethical handling of pro bono work.  
In fact, that Commission failed to include a single representative 
from the Standing Committee on Pro Bono and Public Service into 
its working groups.231  In like manner, PBI and the Association of 
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“Commission created seven Working Groups” to facilitate its review of the Model 
Rules.  Those groups included representatives from the Standing Committee on 
Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Standing Committee on Professional 
Discipline, Standing Committee on Client Protection, Standing Committee on 
Delivery of Legal Services, Section of International Law, Section of Litigation, 
Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar, Section of Real Property, 












Pro Bono Counsel champion the business case for pro bono and 
develop pro bono recommendations from the elite law firm 
perspective.  Neither the ABA nor justice gap pro bono proponents 
sufficiently incorporate full-time advocates for indigent clients into 
the decision-making process.   
As a first step to address problems inherent in the justice gap pro 
bono model, the ABA must include members of the Standing 
Committee on Pro Bono and Public Service in any future revision of 
the Model Rules and invite comments from civil legal aid attorneys 
from different levels of practice to participate in the process.  That 
working group should incorporate guidance specific to pro bono 
work into the Model Rules discussed herein.  Second, the ABA 
should consider amending Model Rule 6.1 to harmonize its language 
with the principle articulated in Rule 6.2(3) that imposes “the same 
obligations” on attorneys serving appointed and paying clients.  The 
commentary for this revised rule should incorporate the Civil Legal 
Aid and Pro Bono Standards by reference, steps that hopefully 
would transform state-level ethics guidance.  Finally, the ABA must 
commission a survey of nonprofit lawyers and pro bono clients to 
assess the degree to which existing pro bono services operate in 
accordance with the best practices outlined in the Civil Legal Aid 
and Pro Bono Standards.  Without improving participation of civil 
legal aid lawyers and the voices of clients, pro bono programs will 
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